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Abstract 
Resolving conflicts between default rules is a major subtask in performing default reasoning. 
A declarative way of controlling the resolution of conflicts is to assign priorities to default rules, 
and to prevent conflict resolution in ways that violate the priorities. This work extends Reiter’s 
default logic with a priority mechanism that is based on lexicographic comparison. Given a default 
theory and a partial ordering on the defaults, the preferred extensions are the lexicographically 
best extensions. We discuss alternative ways of using lexicographic comparison, and investigate 
their properties and relations between them. The applicability of the priority mechanism to 
inheritance reasoning is investigated by presenting two translations from inheritance networks to 
prioritized default theories, and relating them to inheritance theories presented earlier by Gelfond 
and Przymusinska and by Brewka. 0 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. 
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1. Introduction 
Default logic [22] and other nonmonotonic logics 117,181 were devised for solving 
the frame problem in temporal reasoning and for expressing rules with exceptions. Most 
default theories of interest have default rules that conflict, that is, two applicable default 
rules have mutually contradictory conclusions. Only one of two conflicting default rules 
may be applied. In many cases there is a reason to give priority to one of them and ignore 
the other. Priorities in nonmonotonic logics have been investigated by several researchers 
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[ 1,6-8,141. The idea in these approaches is that there is an ordering on the default rules or 
propositions associated with the default rules. 
In this paper, we introduce a priority mechanism to Reiter’s default logic [22], and 
investigate its properties and applicability to a basic formalization of default reasoning, 
inheritance reasoning. Unlike earlier work on priorities and default logic by Baader and 
Hollunder, Brewka, and Marek and Truszczyliski [ 1,7,16], this priority mechanism is based 
on lexicographic comparison that is the most common method of ordering sequences of 
letters or numbers. Lexicographic comparison is widely used in computer science and 
in research areas related to nonmonotonic reasoning. For example, Przymusinski [21] 
defined the perfect model semantics for stratified logic programs in terms of lexicographic 
comparison. Lifschitz [ 141 proposed a way of incorporating priorities into circumscription 
by using lexicographic comparison, and it has also been used by Brewka [6], Ryan [26], 
and Geffner and Pearl [8]. 
The second topic of this paper is the representation of inheritance networks in 
nonmonotonic logics. Gelfond and Przymusinska present translations of inheritance 
networks with single and multiple inheritance to autoepistemic logic [lo]. Brewka shows 
how inheritance in so-called class-property networks can be represented in predicate logic 
with circumscription [4]. We present translations of inheritance networks to prioritized 
default logic, and show that they are equivalent to the afore-mentioned formalizations 
for those classes of inheritance networks the former are defined. The difference between 
our translations is that one of them sanctions reasoning by contraposition. This is also a 
difference between the work by Gelfond and Przymusinska and by Brewka. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. We start by giving the basic definitions related 
to Reiter’s default logic. Section 3.1 introduces our priority mechanism on top of default 
logic. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 show that Brewka’s preferred subtheories and Ryan’s ordered 
theory presentations are special cases of prioritized default logic. In Section 5 we show 
how inheritance networks can be translated to prioritized default logic, and in Section 6 
we show the relation of the inheritance theories of Gelfond and Przymusinska [lo] and 
Brewka [4] to ours. 
2. Default logic 
Reiter’s default logic [22] is one of the main formalizations of nonmonotonic 
reasoning, and its propositional version is the basis of this work. The language of the 
classical propositional logic is denoted by the symbol IZ. The set of all default rules 
b$l,..., /3,,/y I n 3 0, {a, BI, . . . , /In, y} & C) is denoted by D. 
Definition 1 (Reiter [22]). Let A = (D, W) be a default theory. For any set of formulae 
S 2 C, let r(S) be the smallest set such that W C_ T(S), Cn(r(s)) = r(S), and if 
(~$1,. . ., /3,,/y E D and a E f(S) and (-PI,. . , -/In} n S = 8, then y E f(S). A set 
of formulae E 5 C is an extension for A if and only if r(E) = E. 
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A definition of extensions resembling the semiconstructive definition of extensions of 
Reiter (221 is presented by Gelfond, Lifschitz, Przymusinska, and Truszczynski.* This 
definition is equivalent to Definition 1. 
Definition 2 (Gelfond et al. 191). Let (D, W) be a default theory. Let E be a set of 
formulae. Define 
D” = of : 61,. . . > B,, 
ED (-PI ,..., +n)nE=(ll . 
Y I 
Define Cnw(D) as Uiao Cn(Ci), where for all i 3 0, 
Then E is an extension of (D, W) if and only if E = Cnw(DE). 
The notion of generating defaults of an extension is useful because by using it the 
extensions can be represented as a finite set of formulae whenever the set of defaults and 
the set of objective formulae are finite. 
Definition 3 (Reiter [22]). Suppose A = (D, W) is a default theory and E is an extension 
for A. The set of generating defaults for E with respect to A is 
GD(E, A) = 
(Y:Bl,...,B,* 
ED cw~Eand(-B~,...,lrH~}nE=~ 
Y 
Theorem 4 (Reiter [22]). Suppose E is an extension ofa default theory A = (D, W). Then 
E = Cn(W U {y I a : PI,. . . , /L/Y E GIXE, A))). 
The standard consequence relation of default logic is cautious reasoning kc. 
Definition 5. Let A = (D, W) be a default theory and 4 E C a formula. Then A +=c #I if 
and only if 4 E E for all extensions E of A. 
The following terminology is used in referring to default rules of certain syntactic forms. 
Defaults of the form a:/3/p and T:Bl , . . , j?,,l y are, respectively, normal andprerequisite- 
free. Prerequisite-free defaults are often written without prerequisites as :/?I , . . , pn / y We 
shall denote sequences pt. . . . /In of formulae by symbols cr, o’, 01 and so on. 
3. Prioritized default logic 
In this section we introduce our framework of default reasoning with priorities. Priorities 
express the plausibility of pieces of knowledge. For a given knowledge base expressed in 
’ Actually, unlike Gelfond et al., the definition we give here does not eliminate the justifications of defaults 
when constructing DE and makes it explicit what “closed under inference rules” means. 
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Fig. I. The penguin triangle. 
default logic there may be several extensions each of which is a possible meaning of the 
knowledge base. However, an extension can be unacceptable because of the way a conflict 
between defaults is resolved. The simplest example of this is the penguin triangle. 
Example 6. Consider the inheritance network in Fig. 1. 3 The letters p, 4 and r, 
respectively, express the statements that “x is a penguin”, “x is a bird”, and “x is able 
to fly”. The arrows can be understood as stating that penguins are usually birds, birds are 
usually able to fly, and penguins are not usually able to fly. In default logic, these defaults 
can be formalized as D = (p:q/q, p:-r/-r, q:r/r}. It would be correct to conclude that 
a given penguin is not able to fly. For the default theory (D. (p)), however, default logic 
gives the extensions Cn({ p, q, r)) and Cn({ p, q, -r)) that, respectively, correspond to the 
application of the defaults q:rlr and p:-r/-v. The conclusion that x does not fly is not 
supported by the extension Cn({ p, q, r}). 
When sequences of letters are ordered lexicographically there is a unique lexicographi- 
tally best sequence. However, in inheritance reasoning, there in general is no unique best 
extension. The standard example of this phenomenon is the Nixon diamond [24] in Fig. 2. 
In this case the defaults should not be totally ordered: the default stating that quakers usu- 
ally are pacifists does not have a higher priority than the default stating that republicans 
usually are not pacifists, or vice versa. Lexicographic comparison is usually understood 
only in the setting where the criteria according to which two entities are ordered is a totally 
ordered set. In our setting the criteria are not totally ordered, and hence a generalization of 
lexicographic comparison to any strict partial order is needed. 
A natural way to generalize lexicographic comparison to partially ordered criteria is to 
reduce it to lexicographic comparison with totally ordered criteria. It turns out that there are 
two ways of doing this. In the first case a candidate is better than another candidate if the 
former is lexicographically better than the other according to all total orders that extend the 
partial order on the criteria. Now the best candidates are those for which there are no better 
candidates. In the second case a candidate is best if there is a total order on the criteria that 
extends the partial order, and the candidate is better than any other candidate according 
3 Default theories can be depicted as directed graphs with two kinds of arrows. Ordinary arrows going from p 
to 9 represent defaults p:q/q, and broken arrows represent defaults p:--q/-q. 
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Fig. 2. The Nixon diamond 
to lexicographic comparison by using this total order. Hence, instead of requiring that a 
candidate is pairwise no worse than any other candidate by using lexicographic comparison 
with some total order, it is required that the candidate is better than any other candidate by 
using the same total order for all pairwise comparisons. Clearly, this second definition is 
stronger than the first definition in the sense that the set of best candidates is a subset of the 
best candidates in the first case. 
These two definitions of lexicographically best candidates stem from different ways of 
utilizing the partiality in partial orders. A definition that we show equivalent to the first 
definition has been used for example by Geffner and Pearl [8] and Ryan [26]. The second 
definition has been used by Brewka [6]. Neither Geffner and Pearl nor Ryan explicitly 
do the reduction to lexicographic comparison with total orders. Brewka’s definition, on 
the other hand, does not mention lexicographic comparison as it is given as a recursive 
procedure. 
3.1. The definition 
The significance of defaults is represented by strict partial orders, that is, transitive and 
asymmetric relations P. If defaults 6 and 6’ are related by P then the acceptance of 6 is 
more desirable than the acceptance of 6’, and the default 6 is more significant or has a 
higher priority. There are several different interpretations of what it means for a default 
to be accepted or not to be accepted. The first definition we use is based on the notion 
of generating defaults in Definition 3. We say that a generating default of an extension is 
applied in the extension. Hence we classify defaults to those that are applied and to those 
that are not. 
Definition 7 (Application). A default a:/31 , . . . , j&,/y is applied in E E L, if E b a! and 
(+I,. . , +n) n Cn(E) = Id. This is denoted by appl(a:/$, . . , /I,,/y, E). 
Another way of classifying defaults is the following. 
Definition 8 (Defeat). A default a:/31, . . , /3,,/y is defeated in E 2 C, if E + cx and 
(-PI,. , -Bn] n Cn(E) # 8. This is denoted by def(a:/ll, . . . ,6,/y. E). 
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Notice that appl(S, E) implies not def(8, E), and def(S, E) implies not appl(S, E), but 
the converses do not in general hold. For convenience, we use the notation appl(6, E, E’) 
for appl(6, E) and not appl(S, E’). Similarly, def(8, E, E’) means that def(6, E) and not 
def(d, E’). 
Definition 9 (Preferredness). Let A = (D, W) be a default theory and P a strict partial 
order on D. Let E be an extension of A. Then E is a P-preferred extension of A, if there 
is a strict total order I on D such that P C 7 and for all extensions E’ of A and 6 E D, 
appl(d, E’, E) implies that for some E E D, ~76 and appl(&, E, E’). 
Such a strict total order is a A, P-ordering for E. 
Definition 10. The consequence relation /==C ((2P x 2’) x 2vxv) x L is defined by 
A /=p c$ if and only if 4 is in all P-preferred extensions of A. 
We use the notation +p for the consequence relation of prioritized default logic to 
distinguish it from the logical consequence relation + of the classical propositional logic. 
Example 11. The default theory (D, W) with D = {p:q/q, p:-r/-r. q:r/r} and W = 
(p) is depicted in Fig. 1. Let P = ((p:-r/-r, q:r/r)] be a strict partial order on D. The 
default theory has two extensions, El = Cn((p, q. -r)) where the defaults p:-r/-r and 
p:q/q are applied, and Ez = Cn((p, q, r)) where p:q/q and q:r/r are applied. These 
extensions and all strict total orders 7 on D such that P c 7 are depicted below. The most 
significant defaults are the lowest. The symbol l signifies that the default is applied and o 
that it is not applied. 
The extension El is a P-preferred extension because the leftmost strict total order 7~ 
is a A, P-ordering for El: q:r/r is the only default 6 such that appl(d, Ez, El), and 
appl(p:lr/lr, El, E2) and p:-t-l-rllq:rlr. The extension E2 is not a P-preferred 
extension because none of the three strict total orders 71.72, ‘& is a A, P-ordering for 
E2: for all i E (1,2,3), there is the default p:-r/-r such that appl(p:lr/lr, El, E2) and 
there is no default 6 such that G?;p:-r/-r and appl(8. E2, El). 
The alternative way of using the partiality is given in the next definition. 
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Definition 12 (Preferredness2). Let A = (D, W) be a default theory, and P a strict partial 
order on D. Let E be an extension of A. Then E is a P-preferred2 extension of A, if for all 
extensions E’ of A there is a strict total order 7 on D such that P C ‘7 and for all 6 E D, 
appl(d, E’. E) implies that for some E E D, ~76 and appl(e, E, E’). 
Such a strict total order is a A, P-ordering against E’ for E. 
Definition 13. The consequence relation t=.‘C ((2D x 2l) x 2DxD) x C is defined by 
A +G $ if and only if 4 is in all P-preferred2 extensions of A. 
By replacing appl(d, E’, E) by def(S, E, E’) and appl(s, E, E’) by def(s, E’, E) in the 
above definitions, we obtain the definitions of P-preferredd and P-prefetTed2d extensions. 
Similarly we obtain the consequence relations k$, and kg. The subscript d is used 
similarly when referring to different kinds of A, P-orderings. 
Lemma 14 (Inclusion). Let A = (D, W) be u default theory Let P be a strictpurtial order 
on D. If E is u P-preferred extension ef A, then E is a P-preferred2 extension of A. The 
converse does not hold. 
Proof. Let A = (D, W) be a default theory and P a strict partial order on D. If an 
extension E of A is P-preferred, then there is a A, P-ordering 7 for E. Now 7 fulfills 
the condition that for all extensions E’ of A and all defaults 6, appl(d, E’, E) implies that 
for some E E D, ~76 and appl(s, E, E’). Let E’ be any extension of A. By definition of 
A, P-orderings against extensions, 7 is also a A, P-ordering against E’ for E. Because 
this holds for any extension E’, E is a P-preferred? extension of A. 
The following example shows that the converse does not hold. Let A = (D, fl) be a 
default theory with four defaults in D and the strict partial order 
P = {(:-q A r/-q A r, :p/p), (:-p A -r/-p A -r. :q/q)) 
on D. The three extensions Et = Cn((p, q]). E2 = Cn({-q A r. p)), and E3 = Cn({-p A 
-r’, q]) of A and P are depicted below. 
:PlP Xl/Q 00 l o oe 
II II II 
:‘q A +q A r :7pA71-/7pA-~r 00 l o oe 
The extension E 1 is P-preferred2 because of the A, P-ordering 
1-q A r/-q Ar72:p/p72:-p A -r/-p A -r72:qlq 
against E3, and the A, P-ordering 
1-p A -r/-p A-rlj:q/qrj:-q A r/-q Ar73:p/p 
against E2. However, there are no A, P-orderings for El. In particular, 72 is a A, P- 
ordering for Ez, and 73 is a A, P-ordering for E3. Brewka and Junker [ 121 give a similar 
example to show that the preference notions of Brewka [6] and Geffner and Pearl [8] 
differ. q 
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Lemma 15. Let A = (D, W) be a default theory, C#I a formula, and P a strict partial order 
on D. If A kc 4, then A +$c$. If A F$$J, then A t==p 4. 
Our definitions of preferred and preferred2 extensions directly determine a subset of 
all the extensions of a default theory. This is in contrast with some earlier work in 
prioritized nonmonotonic reasoning where priorities impose an ordering on propositional 
models or extensions, and the preferred models or extensions are the minimal or maximal 
elements [8]. It seems that there are no natural definitions of preferred extensions that use 
orderings of extensions in that way. However, preferred2 extensions can be obtained as the 
minimal elements of partial orders on extensions. 
Definition 16. Let A = (D, W) be a default theory and let E and E’ be extensions of A. 
Let P be a strict partial order on D. Then E c$, E’ if and only if E # E’ and for all 6 E D 
and strict total orders 7 on D such that P C 7, 
appl(d, E’, E) implies that for some F E D, ~76 and appl(s, E, E’). 
The assumption concerning P in the next theorem guarantees that all strict total orders 
‘7 on D that extend P are well-orderings, that is, for any non-empty subset of D there is a 
I-least element. 
Theorem 17. Let A = (D, W) be a de@& theory. Let P be a strict partial order on D 
such that for each S E D the set (6’ E D 1 not 8PS’] is finite. Then the relation C$ is 
transitive and asymmetric. 
Proof. Let 7 be a strict total order on D such that P C 7, and let 6 be any member of 
D. By assumption the set B = (6’ E D 1 not SPS’) is finite. Because the set B’ = (6’ E D 1 
not 676’) is a subset of B, it is finite. Hence there are no infinite descending chains from 
any default in D and all strict total orders extending P are well-orderings. 
(Transitivity) Suppose that El C$ E2 and E2 C$ E3. Let 7 be a strict total order 
on D such that P E 7. The result that for all 6 E D such that appl(6, E3, El) there is 
E E D such that ~78 and appl(e, El, E3), is easily obtained by analyzing the case where 
appl(6, E3, El) and not appl(d, E2), and the case where appl(6, E3, El) and appl(b, E2). 
The assumption that strict total orderings that extend P are well-orderings is used here. 
Hence El C$ E3. 
(Asymmetry) From the assumption that El C$ E2 and E2 C$ El for some extensions 
El and E2 of A, a contradiction is derived with the inexistence of infinite descending 
sequences of defaults in D. Hence C$ is asymmetric. q 
The following lemma and theorem establish the fact that the minimal elements of C$ 
are exactly the P-preferred2 extensions of A. 
Lemma 18 ( C$ monotonicity). Let A = (D, W) be a default theory, and P and P’ strict 
purtiul orders on D such thut P’ C P. Then C&CC& 
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Proof. Let E and E’ be extensions of A and E C$, E’. Let 7 be any strict total order 
on D such that P E 7. Because P’ E P, also P’ C 7. Because E C$, E’, for all 6 E D, 
appl(S, E’, E) implies that for some E E D, ~76 and appl(s, E, E’). As this holds for any 
strict total order 7 such that P E ‘7, by definition E c$, E’. Therefore C$,SC$. 0 
Theorem 19. Let A = (D, W) be a default theory, E an extension of A, and P a strict 
partial order on D such thatfor each 6 E D the set (6’ E D 1 not SPS’} isjnite. Then E is 
a P-preferred2 extension of A tfand only if there is no E’ such that E’ C$ E. 
Proof. Assume that E is a P-preferred2 extension of A and E’ is any extension of A such 
that E # E’. By definition of P-preferrednessz, there is a A, P-ordering 7 against E’ for 
E. By definitions of A, P-orderings and Ct. E C$ E’. Because by Theorem 17 C$ is 
asymmetric, not E’ C$ E. By Lemma 18 and the fact that P 5 7, not E’ c$, E. 
Assume E is an extension of A that is not P-preferredz. Then for some extension E’ 
there are no A, P-orderings against E’ for E. Now for all strict total orders 7 on D such 
that P C 7 there is 6~ E D such that appl(61. E’, E) and there is no S’761 such that 
appl(d’, E, E’). Take any strict total order 7 on D such that P C 7. Let S be any default 
in D such that appl(S, E. E’). Now S77S and appl(dl. E’, E). Therefore E’ C$ E. 0 
The relation C$ can be defined directly on the basis of P without reducing lexicographic 
comparison with partial orders to lexicographic comparison with total orders. This kind of 
definition is used by Geffner and Pearl [8] and Ryan [26]. 
Theorem 20. Let E and E’ be extensions of a default theov A = (D, W). Let P be a 
strict partial order on D. Then E C$ E’ if and only if E # E’ andfor all 6 E D, 
appl(J, E’, E) implies thatfor some .S E D, EP~ and appl(s, E, E’). 
Proof. Assume that for all S E D, appl(6, E’. E) implies that for some E E D, eP8 and 
appl(s, E, E’). Let 7 be any strict total order on D such that P C 7. Let S be any member 
of D. If appl(S, E’, E), then by the above assumption there is E E D such that EPK and 
appl(s, E, E’). Because P C 7, also ~76. Because this holds for all 7 such that P C 7. 
by definition E c$, E’. 
Assume that it is not the case that for all S E D, appl(S, E’, E) implies that for some 
E E D, eP8 and appl(e, E, E’). That is, for some 6 E D, appl(6, E’, E) and there is no 
E E D such that EPS and appl(s, E, E’). Take any strict total order 7 on D such that 
P C 7 and 67~ for all EL. E D such that not p.PS. Hence there is no E E D such that &IS 
and appl(s, E, El). By definition of c$, we conclude that not E C$ El. q 
A subclass of strict partial orders that corresponds to the idea of priorities as integer- 
valued functions, is that of layered strict partial orders. With layered strict partial orders 
there cannot be two defaults such that one has a higher priority than the other and both 
have a priority no better nor worse than a third default. Brewka [6] and Benferhat et al. [3] 
discuss this class of priorities in the context of maximally consistent subsets of formulae. 
For this class of strict partial orders there is no difference between preferred and preferred2 
extensions. 
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Theorem 21 (Layered priorities). Let A = (D, W) be a default theory and P a strict 
partial order on D such that P = {(6,6’) ) S E Di, 6’ E Dj, i -C j} for some sets 
D1, D2, . , D,,. Then for all extensions E of A, E is a P-preferred extension if and only 
if E is a P-preferred2 extension. 
Proof. By Lemma 14 each P-preferred extension of A is P-preferredz. We have to show 
that for layered P, each P-preferred2 extension of A is P-preferred. Let E be a P- 
preferred2 extension of A. Let 7 be a strict total order on D such that P C 7 and 676’ 
whenever appl(S, E) and not appl(d’, E) and neither 6P6 nor 6’PS. Such an ordering can 
be constructed by taking defaults in D layer by layer starting from the most significant 
one, and taking the ones applied in E before the ones on the same layer that are not applied 
in E. Let E’ be an extension of A such that E # E’. Because E is P-preferredz, there is 
a A, P-ordering 7’ against E’ for E. Assume appl(6, E’, E) for some S E D. Now there 
is S’ E D such that appl(d’, E, E’) and 8’7’6. If 6’PS, then clearly also 8’76. Otherwise, 
as P 2 I’, not 6PS’, and hence the defaults are on the same layer. Because appl(6’, E) 
and not appl(S, E), by definition 6’76. Hence 7 is a A, P-ordering for E, and E is a 
P-preferred extension of A. 0 
Reiter’s default logic is a special case of prioritized default logic. The embedding is the 
restriction to empty priorities. 
Lemma 22. Let A be a default theory and P the empty relation. Then all extensions of A 
are P-preferred and P-preferredz. 
Proof. Take any extension E of A = (D, W). Take any strict total order 7 on D such 
that P C 7 and for all 6 E D and 6’ E D, 676’ whenever appl(6, E) and not appl(6’. E). 
Assume that there is an extension E’ such that for some 6’ E D, appl(6’, E’, E) but there 
is no 6 E D such that 676’ and appl(S, E, E’). By definition of 7, 676’ for all S such 
that appl(S, E, E’). This means that (6 E D 1 appl(6, E’)} c (6 E D 1 appl(6, E)]. But this 
contradicts Theorems 2.4 and 2.5 in [22]. Hence 7 is a A, P-ordering for E and E is a 
P-preferred extension of A. By Lemma 14 E is a P-preferred2 extension of A. IJ 
The purpose of priorities is to indicate which ways of resolving a conflict between 
defaults are acceptable. If priorities do not determine how a certain conflict should be 
resolved, a form of case analysis is performed by resolving conflicts in all possible ways. If 
more priorities are given, the number of possible ways of resolving the conflicts decreases, 
and the number of conclusions increases. Our definition of priorities has this monotonicity 
property. 
Lemma 23 (Monotonicity). Let A = (D, W) be a default theory. Let E be a P-preferred 
(P-preferred& P-preferreda P-preferredw) extension of A for some strict partial order 
P on D. Let P’ be a strict partial order on D such that P’ c P. Then E is a PI-preferred 
(PI-preferredd, P’-preferredz, PI-preferredzdj extension of A. 
Proof. If E is a P-preferred extension of A, there is a A, P-ordering 7 for E. Because 
P’ E P, 7 is also a A, P’-ordering for E, and hence E is a PI-preferred extension. 
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Similarly if E is a P-preferred2 extension of A, for all extensions E’ of A there is a 
A, P-ordering 7 against E’ for E. Because P’ _C P, I is also a A, P’-ordering against 
E’ for E, and hence E is a P’-preferred2 extension. Proofs for preferredd and preferredzd 
extensions are similar. 0 
Results characterizing preferred2 extensions as minimal elements of strict partial orders 
on extensions indirectly demonstrate that for default theories with a finite non-empty set 
of extensions the existence of preferred2 extensions is guaranteed for any strict partial 
order on the defaults. The next results answer the question of the existence of preferred 
extensions under the same assumptions. For an infinite number of defaults the existence of 
preferred extensions is not guaranteed, and therefore we restrict to finite default theories. 
Lemma 24. Let A = (D, W) be u default theory where D is finite, and let P be a strict 
total order on D. Let A have at least one extension. Then there is exactly one P-preferred 
extension of A. 
Proof. We show that there is an extension E of A such that P is the A, P-ordering for 
E. Let 61, . . . . &betheorderingPofD.DefineD;==(6t ,..., Si]foralli~{O ,.... n). 
DefineforalliE(l,...,n-1), 
X0 = {E 2 fZ ) E is an extension of A}, 
and 
xi+l = 
I 
{E E Xi I appK&+l, El] ifappl(&+l, E) for some E t Xi, 
xi otherwise. 
Induction hypothesis: for j E (0, . . , i ) 
(1) the set Xj is non-empty, 
(2) for all E E Xj and E’ E Xi and 6 E Dj, appl(6, E) if and only if appl(S, E’), and 
(3) for all E E Xj and E’ E Xo\Xj there is 6 E Dj such that appl(d, E, E’) and there is 
no 6’ E D such that 6’PS and appl(d’, E’. E). 
The proofs of both the base case and the inductive case are straightforward. 
The claim of the lemma is obtained from the facts established in the induction proof as 
follows. By (1) the set X, is non-empty. By (2) and Theorems 2.4 and 2.5 in [22] IX,) 6 1. 
Hence X, is a singleton {E). Let Ef be any extension of A. Assume that there is 6’ E D 
such that appl(S, E’, E). Hence E’# E and E’ E Xo\X,. Now by (3) there is 6 E D, = D 
such that appl(b, E, E’) and there is no 8’ such that 6”PS and appl(d”, E’, E). Therefore 
not 6’PS, and because P is a strict total order, it is the case that SPS’. Because this holds 
for all 8’ E D and all extension El of A, P is a A, P-ordering for E. Therefore E is a 
P-preferred extension of A. Let E’ be any extension such that E # E’. Now E E X,, and 
E’ $ X,, and therefore by (3) there is S E D such that appl(S, E, E’) and there is no 6’ E D 
such that 6’PS and appl(S’, E’, E). Hence E is the only P-preferred extension of A. q 
Lemma 25. Let A = (D, W) be a default theory where D is$nite, and let P be any strict 
total order on D. Let A have at least one extension. Then there is exactly one P-preferred:! 
extension of A. 
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Proof. By Lemma 24 there is exactly one P-preferred extension. Because P is layered, 
by Theorem 21 P-preferredness coincides with P-preferrednessz. q 
Existence easily follows for strict partial orders in general. 
Theorem 26. Let A = (D, W) be a default theory where D is jinite. If A has extensions, 
it has both P-preferred and P-preferred2 extensions for any strict partial order P on D. 
Proof. Let P be any strict partial order on D. Let 7 be a strict total order on D such that 
P C 7. By Lemmata 24 and 25 there are I-preferred and I-preferred2 extensions of A. 
By Lemma 23 they are also P-preferred and P-preferredz. q 
4. Related work on priorities 
In this section we show the connection of the lexicographic prioritized default logic to 
the work by Brewka [6] and Ryan [26]. Other related work include Geffner and Pearl [8] 
who use lexicographic comparison in the same way as Ryan does. The prioritization 
in prioritized default logics of Brewka [7], Baader and Hollunder [l], and Marek and 
Truszczynski [ 161 is lexicographic when the defaults are prerequisite-free normal. 
4. I. Priorities and maximal consistent subsets 
Poole [20] investigates default reasoning in a framework that is based on maximal 
consistent subsets of sets of formulae. Brewka [6] extends this framework with priorities. 
He calls this generalization preferred subtheories. Brewka gives two definitions, one of 
which is more general than the other and in which formulae are ordered by strict partial 
orders. 
Definition 27 (Brewka [6]). Let I3 be a strict partial order on a finite set of formulae T. 
Let 0 be a set of formulae. The set S is a preferred subtheory of (T, 0, I?) if and only if 
there is a strict total order tl , t2, . . , tn on T that extends I3 and S = S, where So = 0, and 
sj+, = S, U (ti+t) if Si U [ti+l} is consistent, 
Si otherwise. 
foralliE(O,...,n]. 
We have taken the liberty to extend Brewka’s definition slightly. Brewka does not have 
the second component 0. Whenever 0 is consistent, 0 could be taken to be the formulae 
with the highest priority. The reason for our modification is that it makes the presentation 
of some of the results in later sections more convenient. 
The next lemmata and theorems show the connection between preferred subtheories and 
prioritized default logic. Brewka has earlier defined a prioritized version of default logic 
that restricts to prerequisite-free normal defaults [.5]. 
Definition 28. Let C9 = (T, 0, B) where T and 0 are sets of formulae and 13 is a strict 
partial order on T. Then define 
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Lemma 29. Let 0 be a consistent set of formulae and T a set of formulae. The sets 
St for i E {0, , n) and (T, 0. I?) in Definition 27 are maximal consistent subsets of 
(t]:...,ti)UO. 
Lemma 30. Let T be a set of formulae and 0 a consistent set of formulae. Let S be a 
maximal consistent subset of T U 0 that contains 0. Then Cn(S) is an extension of the 
default theory trps( T, 0, B)). 
Lemma 31. Let T be a set offormulae, 0 a consistent set offormulae, and E an extension 
of trps((T. 0, a)). Then S = E f’ (T U 0) is a maximal consistent subset of T U 0 and 
E = Cn(S). 
Lemma 32. Let T be a set offormulae and 0 a consistent set offormulae. Then for all 
C$ E T and all extensions E of trPs (( T: 0, a)), -4 $ E if and only tf 4 E E. 
Theorem 33. Let S beapreferredsubtheog!of(T, 0, L?). Then Cn(S) isa pp,((T, 0, L?))- 
preferred extension of trps (( T, 0. B) ). 
Proof. Assume 0 is inconsistent. Then S = 0 is the only preferred subtheory of 
(T, 0. I?) and Cn(S> = C is the only extension of tr,,((T, 0, I?)). By Theorem 26 
Cn(S) is a pp,((T, 0, @)-preferred extension. Assume 0 is consistent. Because S is 
a preferred subtheory of (T, 0, I?), there is a total ordering tl , . , tn of T as given in 
Definition 27. Let 7 be the total ordering :tl/tl, . . . , :t,,/tn. Clearly pp,((T, 0, L?)) c 7. 
We show that 7 is a trps((T, 0, I?)), pPs((T, 0, @)-ordering for Cn(S). Assume that for 
an extension E of trps((T, O,f?)) there is tk E T such that appl(:tk/tk, E,Cn(S)). We 
derive a contradiction from the assumption that there is no 1 E ( 1, . . . k - 1 } such that 
appl(:tr/tl, Cn(S), E). Now Cn(S) fl (tl.. . , tk-l} 2 En (tl...., tk-1). Because -tk E 
Cn(S), (S f? ({tl, . . , tk-1) U 0)) U {tk] is inconsistent. By Lemma 31 E is consistent 
and hence also its subset (E fl ((tl, . , tk_I] U 0)) U {tk] is consistent. Because of this 
contradiction, there must be t E {tl, . , tk-I} such that appl(:t/t, Cn(S), E). Therefore 
I is a trps((T, 0, I?)), pp,((T, 0, B))-ordering for Cn(S>, and Cn(S) is a pps((T, 0, I?))- 
preferred extension of trps( T, 0, I?)). q 
Theorem 34. Let E be a pps(( T, 0, @)-preferred extension of trps( T, 0,23)). Then 
E f’ (T U 0) is a preferred subtheory of (T, 0, L3) and E = Cn(E rl (T U 0)). 
Proof. Assume E is inconsistent. Then 0 is inconsistent by Corollary 2.2 in [22], and 0 
is the only preferred subtheory of (T, 0. B). So assume that E is consistent. Then there 
is a tr,,((T, 0. x3)), pp,((T, 0,13))-ordering 7 for E. Let 7 be :tl/tl, . . . . :tli,/tn. The 
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proof that E n (T U 0) is a preferred subtheory is by induction. We construct a preferred 
subtheory S, according to Definition 27 so that E = Cn(& j. 
Induction hypothesis: Si = E 13 ((tl , . . . , ti ) U 0). 
Base case i = 0: SO = 0 = E f’ (II U 0) by definition of SO and because 0 c E. 
Inductive case i 3 1: Assume Si_ 1 U (ti } is consistent. Now Si = Si_1 U (ti }. There is 
a maximal consistent subset S of T U 0 such that Si C S. Hence Cn(S) is an extension 
of trps((T, 0,23)) by Lemma 30. Clearly not appl(S, E, Cn(S)) for all 6’T:ti/ti. Because 
7 is a trps((T, 0, a)), pPs((7’, 0, @)-ordering for E, not appl(:ti/ti, Cn(S), E). Hence 
appl(:ti/ti, E) and ti E E. Assume Si_t U (ti} is inconsistent. Hence Si = Si_t and 
ti $ Si . Because Si C E and E is consistent, ti 6 E. Hence Si = E fl ({tl , . . . , ti } U 
0). 0 
4.2. Ordered theory presentations 
Ryan [26] defines ordered theory presentations (OTPsj as partial orders on sets of 
formulae. The ordering expresses the plausibility of the formulae and the maximal 
elements are the most plausible. An OTP determines a partial order on the models of 
the language L. The consequences of an OTP are the formulae that are true in all the 
maximal models. An interesting novelty in OTPs is the use of natural consequences of 
formulae. Natural consequences are logical consequences that as truth-functions fulfill 
certain monotonicity conditions. In this section we show the connection of OTPs to 
prioritized default logic. 
Definition 35 (Ryan [26]). A formula 4 is monotonic in p (written p E ++), if for all 
models M and N such that N b p and for all propositional variables q # p M /= q if and 
onlyifN+q,M+$impliesNb@. 
A formula 4 is anti-monotonic in p (written p c @-), if for all models M and N such 
that N F p and for all propositional variables q # p M /= q if and only if N + q, M b 4 
implies N + 4. 
A formula 4 is a natural consequence of 4, written 4 +” @, if 4 /= + and 4+ C I/Y+ and 
4- c $I-. 
The motivation for introducing natural consequences is that even when a formula cannot 
be satisfied simultaneously with some other formulae, some part of it can. For example, 
some of the natural consequences of p A q are p, q, and p v q. The set of natural 
consequences of a formula is infinite. If 4 is a natural consequence of a formula, then so 
are l+ , ---+I and so on. In the propositional case, instead of the set of all natural 
consequences of a formulae, equivalently a finite set of natural consequences can be 
used. This is because the syntactic properties of the natural consequences are not used 
in the definitions, and therefore it suffices to consider for each formula 4 only one natural 
consequence from each equivalence class of logically equivalent natural consequences, of 
which there are only a finite number. 
The following is the definition of OTPs and ordering relations induced by OTPs on 
propositional models. 
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Definition 36 (Ryan [26]). Let X be a set, < a partial order (an antisymmetric, reflexive 
and transitive relation) on X and F : X + C a function that maps elements of X to 
formulae. Then f = (X, <, F) is an OTP. 
Let M and N belong to M (the collection of all models). Then M ‘6 N, if for all 
$ E C, $J +-r,k implies (M + @ implies N + @). 
Let r = (X, <, F) be an OTP, and let M. N E M. Then M cr N if for each x E X, if 
M go N then there is y < x such that M up N (that is, A4 EF(~) N and N $ZF(~) M). 
Let f be an OTP, and M an element of M. Then M t= f if M is Er-maximal. 
Let r be an OTP. Then r + 4, if for each M E M, M /= r implies M + 4. 
The following translation of OTPs to prioritized default logic resembles the translation 
of preferred subtheories in Section 4.1. By < we mean the strict (asymmetric) partial order 
1(x*)‘) Ix<v.x#.v]. 
Definition 37. Let r = (X, <, F) be an OTP. The translation of r to prioritized default 
logic is defined by the following functions: 
x E X. y E X.x < y, F(x) I&, F(y) k”$ 
Because Ryan allows multiple occurrences of the same formula in an OTP and different 
formulae may share natural consequences, there is a problem with our definition of 
priorities where there may be only one occurrence of each default in the partial order 
that expresses the priorities. It can be solved by renaming each propositional variable p 
occurring in a natural consequence of a formula F(x) to px and extending the translation 
of an OTP with equivalences p * px. Our discussion of OTPs from now on assumes that 
formulae do not share natural consequences. 
The main result about OTPs is Theorem 41 the proof of which uses the following three 
lemmata. 
Lemma 38. Let r = (X, 6, F) be an OTP where < is a well-ordering. Let E and E’ 
be extensions of tr,(r) and let M and M’ be models of E and E’, respectively. Then 
E c~~~~ E’ ifand only ifM/ cr M. 
Proof. In this proof we use the alternative definition of CP that is given in Theorem 20. 
Let P = p,(T) and A = (0, M) = tr,,(F). 
(=+) Assume E C$ E’. Assume M’ t&cx) M for some x E X. That is, for some 4, 
F(x) b-4 and M’ + C#J and M p 4. By Lemma 32 C$ E E’\E and appl(:r$/d, E’, E). 
Because E c$ E’ there is :@I$ E D such that :$/@‘:c$/~ and appl(:@/$, E, E’). Take 
:$I/$ to be a P-minimal element of D such that :+/I@‘:c$/@ and appl(:@/@, E, E’). 
Such an element exists because P is a well-ordering. Because $ E E\E’, by Lemma 32 
M /= I+!J and M’ lf; +, and because :$/@P:q5/q5 there is y E X such that F(y) +-$ and 
_Y < x. Hence M &fy) M’. It remains to show that M’ EF(,.) M. Assume the opposite, 
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that is, for some w, F(y) 6~ and M’ + w and M + w. This implies by Lemma 32 that 
w E E’\E. Now because E C$ El there should be :8/Q E D such that :0/OP:,/, and 
appl(:G/Q, E, E’), and consequently there is z E X such that F(z) b”O. Because F(y) b-=0 
and :O/BP:w/o, z < y. Hence :H/6P:$r/@P:$l@. Th’ 1s contradicts the assumption that 
:$/+ is a P-minimal element such that :$/$P:@/@ and appl(:@/+, E, E’). Therefore 
for all w such that F(y) + w, M’ + o implies M b w. Therefore M’ &F(,~) M. Because 
M go M’ and M’ &F(~) M, M’ CF(~) M. This completes the proof of M’ 5’ M. 
To prove that M gr IV?, we show that there is x E X such that M &cx) M’ and there is 
no y E X such that y < x and M c,v(~) M’. Take $14 to be such that appl($/@, E, E’) 
and there is no S such that SP:4/@ and appl(6. E, E’). Such a $I/@ exists because P is a 
well-ordering, and as E C$ E’, E # E’ and by Theorems 2.4 and 2.5 in [22] there must 
be some :$I/$ such that appl(:@/@, E. E’). Now M + 4 and M’ k 4. By definition of 
A there is x E X such that F(x) +“$. Now M FF(.~) M’. Assume there is y such that 
y < x and M CF(~) M’. Now there is 1// such that F(y) +“I/J and M k + and M’ /= $, 
and therefore $I E E’\E by Lemma 32 and :$rl@P:@/@ by the definition of P. Because 
E C$ E’ there is :x/xP:$/@ such that appl(:x/x, E. E’). Now :x/xP:$l@P:@/@. 
This, however, contradicts our assumption that :4/b is a P-minimal default such that 
appl(@/$, E, E’). Hence there is no y E X such that y 6 x and M &(,) M’. Therefore 
M’c’ M. 
(%) Assume M’ Cr M, that is, M’ Lr M and M $Zr M’. We show that E C$ E’, that 
is, for all 6 E D, if appl(6, E’, E) then there is 6’PJ such that appl(6’, E, E’). Assume 
appl(:#/4, E’, E). Now M F tp and M’ + # and F(x) j=- # for some x E X. Hence 
M’ @cx) M. Because M’ Lr M, M’ &cx) M implies the existence of y E X such that 
y < x and M’ c,c(~) M. Now it must be the case that y # x and hence y < x. Further, 
for some w, F(y) t=-a_~ and M’ &t w and M + w. By definition of P, :w/wP:@/$. By 
Lemma 32, w E E\E’, and thus appl(:w/w, E, E’). Hence there is :w/w E D such that 
appl(:w/o, E, E’) and :w/wP:qf~/~#~, and finally E c$, E’. 0 
Lemma 39. Let F = (X, 6, F) be an OTP, and 4 E C a formula. If 4 $ E for some 
p,(F)-preferred2 extension E, then there is a Gr -maximal model M such that M F 4. 
Proof. Let E be a pO( f )-preferred2 extension of trO( f) such that 4 4 E. Hence there 
is a model M such that M + E U (-4). Assume there is N such that M Cr N. The set 
a = (I# ] N /= I$, F(x) +“$, x E X} is not necessarily a maximal consistent subset of T = 
(4 1 F(x) b” 4, x t X}. Let Q’ be a maximal consistent set of T such that 52 2 52’ C T. 
Because Sz’ is consistent, it has a model L. Now N CF(~) L for all x E X, because for 
all (p and x E X such that F(x) +“$J, N + 4 implies L b 4. Therefore N rr L and by 
the transitivity of cr, M ~~ L. Because Q’ is a maximal consistent subset of T, there 
is by Lemma 30 an extension E’ = Cn(0’) of tr,(r). By Lemma 38 E’ c~,(T) E. This 
contradicts the P-preferredness;! of E, and hence M is Lr-maximal. q 
Lemma 40. Let F = (X, 6, F) be an OTP. Let 4 E C be a formula. If M k 4 for some 
cr -maximal model M, then there is a pa(F)-preferred2 extension E of tr,(r) such that 
44E. 
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Proof. Let T = (4 1 F(x) +” 4, x E X}. Let M be a cr-maximal model. Clearly, I7 = 
(4 E T 1 M + C#J} is a consistent subset of T. Assume n is not maximal, that is, there is 
a consistent set R c T such that n c a. Now M’ + Q for some model M’. Clearly, for 
no x E T, M /=x and M’ E x. Hence M cr M’. Take any x E Q\n. Now M’ I= x and 
M l& x Hence M’ gr M, and finally M cr M’. This contradicts the cr-maximality of 
M, so n must be a maximal consistent subset of T. Hence by Lemma 30 Cn(n) is an 
extension of tr,( r). Because M l= n and M &t 4, 4 $ Cn(n). Assume E = Cn(n) is 
not pO(f )-preferredz. By Lemma 38, there would be a model N for which M cr N. This 
would contradict the gr -maximality of M. Hence E is p,(f)-preferred2 and 4 6 E. q 
Theorem 41. Let r = (X, <, F) be an OTP where < is a well-ordering. Then r b 4 if 
and only if 4 belongs to all p0 (r)-preferred? extensions of tr, (f ). 
Proof. 
f /= C$ iff M /= $ for all cr -maximal models M, 
iff there is no Cr -maximal model M such that M F Cp, 
iff there is no pa(r)-preferred2 extension E such that 4 $ E, 
iff q5 E E for all p,(f )-preferred2 extensions E. 
The third equivalence is by Lemmata 39 and 40: 4 $! E for some p,(r)-preferred2 
extension E of tr,(r) if and only if M l& 4 for some C_‘-maximal model M. CI 
The use of natural consequences in OTPs is the first difference between preferred 
subtheories of Brewka and Ryan’s ordered theory presentations. However, this difference is 
independent of the kind of model minimization used, and natural consequences of formulae 
can be used in conjunction of preferred subtheories as well. The second difference is 
that Ryan’s preference notion corresponds to preferred2 extensions in prioritized default 
logic, and Brewka’s preferred subtheories correspond to preferred extensions. A preference 
notion equivalent to Ryan’s has been used by Geffner and Pearl in their definition of 
conditional entailment [8]. 
5. Representation of inheritance networks in prioritized default logic 
In this section we give two translations of inheritance networks to default logic. We 
prove that the second translation is equivalent to the first translation in the sense that 
it sanctions exactly the same positive literals as consequences. In Section 6 we show 
the connection between our translations and the translational theories of Gelfond and 
Przymusinska [lo] and Brewka [4]. A detailed overview of inheritance reasoning is given 
in [l I]. 
5. I. Definition of inheritance networks 
We define inheritance networks as quadruples G = (V, E. P, N). The set V consists of 
nodes that correspond to classes and properties, and E 5 V x V x (0, 1,2,3] is a set of 
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links. The polarity of a link (u) , ~2, p) is p. If the polarity is 0 or 1, the link is defeasible. 
If the polarity is 2 or 3, the link is strict. If the polarity is 0 or 2, the link is positive. If 
the polarity is 1 or 3, the link is negative. We consider inheritance reasoning with one 
individual only. The sets P S V and N C V state that the individual respectively belongs 
and does not belong to a class. 
A sequence (vi, 201, PI), . .., (u,, wn, pn) of links in E is a path from ur to lun, if 
w;=vj+tforalliE(l,..., n-l}.Thepathispositive,ifp~isOor2foralli~{l,...,n]. 
The empty path from any node to itself is also a path. An inheritance network is acyclic if 
there is a function f from V to the integers such that f(ui ) < f(v2) whenever there is a 
link (VI ,712, p) E E. This is equivalent to the inexistence of a non-empty path from a node 
to itself. The rank r(p) of a node p E V is defined as the length of a longest path in G that 
ends in p. This notion was used in [lo]. 
5.2. The translation 
A translation of inheritance networks to default theories is as follows. 
Definition 42. Assume G = (V, E, P, N) is an inheritance network. The translation of G 
into default logic is AC = (D, W), where 
W=Pu(-PIPEN]. 
In addition to this translation, in Section 5.3 we present a closely related translation in 
which defaults are prerequisite-free normal. 
We adopt the terminology concerning paths and ranks of nodes in inheritance networks 
also in the setting of default theories. If A is the translation of an inheritance network G, 
then there is a path from p to q in A if there is a path from p to q in G. Also, there is a 
path from -p or p to -q or q in A, if there is a path from p to q in G. The rank r(1) of 
a literal I= p or 1 = -p in a default theory A is the rank r(p) of the node p in G. For a 
default 6 with the conclusion I we define r(6) = r(1). 
The above translation uses non-normal defaults, and not all non-normal default 
theories have extensions. We restrict to a subclass of inheritance networks such that the 
corresponding default theories have at least one extension. Like in most of the research on 
inheritance reasoning, our inheritance networks are acyclic and finite. 
Definition 43 (Good). Let G = (V, E, P, N) be an inheritance network. Then G is good 
if: 
(1) G is acyclic, 
(2) V is finite, 
(3) P nN=m, 
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(4) there is no node p E V such that (q, p. 2) E E and (q’, p, 3) E E for some q E V 
andq’E V, 
(5) there is no node p E V such that (q, p, 2) E E and p E N for some q l V, 
(6) there is no node p E V such that (q, p, 3) E E and p E P for some q E V, 
(7) s = s’ whenever (p, q, s) E E and (p, q. s’) E E, and 
(8) there is no defeasible link (p, q, n) E E and strict link (p’, q’, n’) E E such that 
q = p’. 
Conditions (3)-(6) ensure that there are no unresolvable conflicts, that is, there is always 
a defeasible link involved in a conflict, and hence all conflicts can be resolved by rejecting 
a defeasible link. 
Lemma 44. Let G be a good inheritance network and AG = (D, W) the translation ofG 
as given in Dejinition 42. Then the set W U {p 1 p:/B E D) is consistent. 
Lemma 45. Let G be a good inheritance network. Then the default theory AG given in 
Definition 42 has at least one extension, and all extensions of Ac are consistent. 
Definition 46 (Priorities). Let G be an inheritance network. Let AC = (0, W) be the 
translation of G as given in Definition 42. Let PG be the smallest transitive relation such 
-- 
that the following holds. For defaults p:n/n, r:rr/rr and ~:a/@ in D, p:n/nPGr:n/n 
whenever there is a non-empty positive path from p to r, and p:n/nPcs:o/# whenever 
there is a path from it to s. Here p, r and s are propositional variables, n and $J are literals, 
and cr is the empty sequence or consists of one literal. 
Lemma 47. Let G be an acyclic inheritance network. Then PG, as given in Dejinition 46, 
is a strict partial order: 
In Section 6.1 we show that the translation given in this section coincides with a 
translational theory of inheritance presented by Gelfond and Przymusinska [lo]. 
5.3. Inheritance reasoning with prerequisite-free dejtiults 
Inheritance networks can also be represented as prerequisite-free normal default 
theories. In this case the links have the contraposition property as they are represented 
as defaults :p -+ B/p + B. The translation of normal defaults with prerequisites to 
prerequisite-free normal defaults uses the function I (0) = {:p -+ b/p -+ /3 1 p:/?//? E D}. 
Also define I-‘(D) = {p:p/B ( :p+ B/p-+ /? E DJ. For translation of strict links define 
1, (D) = {p -+ ,13 ) p:/@ E D]. The following lemmata show that for each extension of 
(D, W), there is an extension of (I(D), W U Is (D)) that defeats the corresponding defaults, 
and vice versa. 
Lemma 48. Let G be a good inheritance network and AG = (D, W) the translation qf 
G as given in Dejinition 42. Let A’ = (I(D). W U I,(D)). Let E be an extension of 
AC and F = (6 E D ) notdef(6, E)]. Then there is an extension E’ of A’ such that 
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Z(F) = (6 E Z(D) ) not def(S. E’)} and for all propositional variables p, p E E if and 
only if p E E’. 
Proof. Let S = (4 1 :q5/q5 E Z(F)) U W U Z,T(D). 
Claim A. For all literals n, T E E implies S /= n. 
Proof. By Definition 2 and Lemma A.4 E = Cnw (F). Let Co, Cl, . . be the sets for 
Cnw (F) in Definition 2. 
Induction hypothesis: For all literals n, Ci /= n implies S b n . 
Base case i = 0: Because CO = W and W s S, CO t= n implies S b n for all literals n. 
Inductive case i 3 1: Assume Ci b n If n E Cn(Ci _ 1) 2 Cn(Ci ), then by monotonicity 
of b and by induction hypothesis S t= rr. If n E Cn(Ci)\Cn(Ci_t), then because E is 
consistent by Lemma 45, there is q :o/n E F such that Ci - 1 b q . By induction hypothesis 
S/=q.Becauseq-+n~(~~:~/~~Z(F)}UZ.s(D)~S,finallyS/=rr. 0 
Let M be a propositional model such that for all propositional variables p, M b p iff 
p E E. 
Claim B. M /= S. 
Proof. Because G is a good inheritance network, E is consistent by Lemma 45. If -p E E, 
then p $ E because E is consistent, and hence M b -p. Therefore M + n for all 
literals n E E. Specifically M + W because W 5 E and W is a set of literals. Assume 
p -+ /3 E {@ ) :@/qb E Z(F)] U Z,y (D) = S\ W and M /= p. Now either by definition of 
F not def(p:/I/fi, E), or because defaults without justifications cannot be defeated, not 
def(p:/@, E). Because M + p, p E E. Because not def(p:a/B, E), /3 E E. Hence M /= B 
and M b p -+ B. If M k p, then immediately M I= p + B. Therefore M t= S. 0 
Claim C. For all propositional variables p, S + p ifand only if M /= p. 
Proof. Assume S t= p. Because M /= S by Claim B, M b p. Assume S k p. By Claim A 
p$E.BydefinitionofM,MFp. q 
ClaimD. SU{p-+p) isinconsistentforall :p+#I/p-+@ E Z(D)\Z(F). 
Proof. Assume :p-+jI/p+fl E Z(D)\Z(F). Hence def(p:B/p, E), that is, p E E and 
-B~E.ByClaimAS~pands~=~.HenceSU{p~B]isinconsistent. q 
By Claims B and D S is a maximal consistent subset of (4 1 :4/$ E Z(D)) U W U Is(D), 
and by Lemma 30 E’ = Cn(S) is an extension of (I (D), W U Z,s (D)). Clearly, no member 
of Z (F) is defeated in Cn(S), and members of Z (D)\Z (F) are defeated in Cn(S). By 
Claim C p E Cn(S) if and only if M t= p, and M 1 p if and only if p E E by definition 
ofM. q 
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The proof in the opposite direction requires priorities, because when links are 
represented as prerequisite-free defaults, a conflict between two links can lead to the defeat 
of a link lower in the inheritance network. This cannot happen in the first translation, and 
priorities are needed to prevent it in the second. 
Lemma 49. Let G be a good inheritance network and AC = (D, W) the translation of 
G as given in De$nition 42. Let A’ = (Z(D), W U I,v (D)). Let P be a strict partial order 
on I(D) such that :p -+ p/p + ,bP:p’ -+ /Y/p’-+ B’ whenever B = p’. Let E’ be a P- 
preferredd extension of A’ and F’ = (S E Z(D) 1 not def(6, E’)]. Then there is an extension 
E C E’ of AG such that I-‘(F’) U (p:/B E 01) = (6 E D 1 notdef(6, E)} and for all 
propositional variables p, p E E if and only if p E E’. 
Proof. Define Tr(D, W, E) = Cn(W U (p A /? E E 1 p:o/B E DJ) for sets of defaults 
D and sets of formulae W and E. Let E = Tr( D, W, E’). We first show that E is an 
extension of AC. Because E’ is a P-preferredd extension of A’ and defaults in A’ are 
prerequisite-free normal, by Theorem 34 E’ = Cn(S) for some preferred subtheory S of 
((4 I :q5/@ E I(D)), W U Z,(D), P’) where P’= {(q5,$‘) I :@/~P:@/qb’). Let n = IZ(D)i. 
Let 7 be the strict total order and SO, . . , S, the sets in Definition 27 with the properties 
P’ C I and S = S,. Let PI--+ /31, . , pn + Bn be the ordering 1. Define Si = p; :Bi/Bi 
for all i E (1,. . . , n). Define Di = (81,. . . , Si) U (p://? E Dl} for all i E {0, . . , n). 
Induction hypothesis: Ei = Tr( Di , W, Cn(Si)) is an extension of (Dt , W). 
Base case i = 0: Let p; :I#, . . , pk:/#, be a strict total order on Do so that j < k 
whenever BJ = p:. There is such an ordering because G is good and therefore acyclic. 
Define D) = {p;:/B;, , pJ:/#$) for all j E (0.. . ., m}. Define Si = W U {p + B I 
p:/fi E Di}. By Lemma 44 S; is consistent for all ,j E (0,. . ., m). Clearly, Sj is the 
unique extension of (ti, W U Z,Y(Di)) for all j E (0,. . . , m). Induction hypothesis: E) = 
Tr(Dj, W, Cn(Si)) is an extension of (Di, W). Base case j = 0: The result is immediate 
as Tr(Dh. W, Cn(S$) = Cn(W) and Cn(W) is an extension of (fl, W). Inductive case 
j > 1: By definition S,; = S.i_, U (pi -+ Bj ). Assume Sj_, k p; . Hence S,; + p: A /33 
and E) = Cn(Ei_, U {pj A f$)). Because S(I_, + pi: by Lemma A.9 either ps E W or 
I I I Sj_, bpforsomep-+pj cSj_,. In both cases pi E Ei_, . Therefore by Lemma A.8 ES 
is an extension of (D), W). Assume SJ_, ,& p) . By Lemma A. 10 the set of propositional 
variables in Cn(Si)\Cn(S/i_,) is a subset of {PI} and as G is acyclic, p) # B,;. Hence 
pi +! Cn(Si), pi A #$ q! Cn(S,i) and pi A /3; 6 ES. Therefore E; = Ei_l. By induction 
hypothesis and Lemma A.7 ES is an extension of (D) , W). 
Inductive case i > 1: Assume Si-r U {pi + pi) k inconsistent. Therefore Si = Si_1. 
NOW pi A 6 E Cn(Si_1) and because S;_r is consistent, pi A /Ii +! Cn(Si_t), and hence 
Ei = E;_l . Because Si-1 + E and by assumption there are no formulae pi -+/I’ E Si-1 
for any /I’, by Lemma A.9 either E E W C Si-1 or /J’+ /I; E Si_r E (4 1 x)/q5 E 
Z(D)) U I, (D) and Si_ 1 f= p’ for some /3’. In both cases pi E Ei_ 1. Hence by Lemma A.6 
Ei is an extension of (Di , W). 
Assume Si-1 U {pi -+ /5i) is consistent. Then S; = Si-1 U (pi -+@;}. By Lemma A.10 
the set of propositional variables in Cn(S;)\Cn(S;_l) is a subset of {pi). Because G 
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is acyclic, pi # Z3i, and hence pi E Si if and only if pi E S’_1. Assume Si_ 1 /== pi. 
Hence Si b pi A /3i and Ei = Cn(Ei_1 U {pi A /Ii}). Because Si_t b pi, by Lemma A.9 
either pi E W or S’_1 + p for some p + pi E Si_t . Hence pi E El_,. Therefore by 
Lemma A.8 Ei is an extension of (Di, W). Assume Si-1 k pi. Hence pi A j3i $ Cn(Si) 
and p; A pi +! Ei. Therefore Ei = Ei_1. By induction hypothesis and Lemma A.7 Ei is 
an extension of (Di , W). This finishes the induction proof, and the case i = n shows that 
E = Tr(D,, W, Cn(S,)) is an extension of (D,, W) = (D, W). 
Because E C E’, for all propositional variables p, p E E implies p E E’. Assume 
p E E’ = Cn(S,). By Lemma A.9 p E W or q -+ p E $I and S,, b q for some q. 
Hence either p E W E: E or by definition q A p E Tr(D. W. Cn(S,)) = E. Hence for all 
propositional variables p, p E E if and only if p E E’. 
Next we show that ZZ’(F’) U (p:/p E Dl} & (6 E D 1 not def(S, E)). For p://3 E D 
not def(p:/B, E) is immediate because defaults without justifications are defeated in no 
extension. Assume p:BfB E I-’ (F’). Hence p A -/II $ E’. Because E 2 El, p A -b q! E. 
Hence not def(p:/?//3, E). Hence no member of I-’ (F’) U (p://I E 01) is defeated in E. 
To prove the inclusion in the opposite direction, we use Lemma 49 and the results 
obtained in the proof so far. Assume E’ is an extension of A’. By the above results 
there is an extension E of AC such that I-‘(F’) U (p://3 E Dl] C F, where F’ = (6 E 
Z(D) 1 not def(d, E’)} and F = (6 E D ( not def(d, E)). Hence F’ C Z(F). By Lemma 48 
there is an extension Ei of A’ such that Z (F) = (6 E Z(D) ( not def(S, Ei)] = F;. Now 
F’ C Z(F) = Fi. By Theorem 2.4 in [22], Lemmata A.4 and A.2 and Definition 2 it cannot 
be the case that F’ c F;. Hence F’ = Z(F). Therefore I-‘(F’) U (p:/B E 01) = (8 E D ( 
not def(S, E)]. q 
Lemma 50. Let G be a good inheritance network and AC = (D, W) the tram&ion of G 
as given in Dejinition 42. Let P be a strict partial order on D such that p:/3 f BPp’:B’l/3’ 
wheneverfi=p’. LetA’=(Z(D), WUZ,(D)). LetP’=((:p-+fi/p+/?,:p’+~‘/p’-+ 
B’) I P:BIBpP’:B’IB’l. 
(1) Zf E’ is a Q’-preferredd extension of A’, then there is a P-preferredd extension E oj 
AG such thatfor all propositional variables p, p E E if and only if p E E’. 
(2) If E is a P-preferredd extension of AC, then there is a ?I-preferredd extension E’ 
of A’ such thatfor all propositional variables p, p E E if and only if p E E’. 
Proof. (1) Let E’ be a P’-preferredd extension of A’. Let F’ = (6 E Z (0) 1 not def(6, E’)]. 
Let 7’ be a A’, ?‘-orderingd for E’. By Lemma 49 there is an extension E of AC such that 
I-‘(F’) U (p:/p E 01) = F = (8 E D ( not def(d, E)}. Let 7 be a strict total order on D 
such that P G 7 and 7’ = ((:p+B/p-+/I, :p’+B’/p’-+/Y) I (p:/3/p, p’:/3’//?‘) E 7). 
We claim that 7 is a AC, P-orderingd for E. Assume that this is not the case, that is, there 
is an extension E2 and a default S E D such that def(S, E, E2) and there is no 6’76 such 
that def(S’, E2, E). Let F2 = (S E D I not def(6, Ez)}. By Lemma 48 there is E” such that 
Z(F2) = (6 E Z(D) 1 not def(d, E”)) = F”. Let (6,) = 1((J)). Now def(b,, E’, E”) and 
there is no 6’7’6, such that def(S’, E”, E’). This contradicts the fact that 7’ is a A’, P’- 
orderingd for E’. Hence 7 is a AC, P-orderingd for E, and E is a ?-preferredd extension 
of AC. By Lemma 49, for all propositional variables p, p E E if and only if p E E’. 
(2) Proof is analogous to the first case. q 
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Finally, we establish the main result of this section. 
Theorem 51. Let G be a good inheritance network and AC the translation of G as given 
in Dejinition 42. Let PC be the strict total order for AC given in Definition 46. Let 
P = ((:p+ ,6/p-+ /3, :p’+ B’lp’-+ B’) ) p:#?/BP~p’:/3’//3’}. Then for all propositional 
variables p, (D, W) t=$, p if and only if (I(D), W U l,y (D)) k$ p. 
Proof. The strict partial order P fulfills the property that :p -+ /3/p+ /3P:p’+ /3’/p’-+ /3’ 
whenever B = p’. For propositional variables p, the existence of a PG -preferredd extension 
E of (D, W) such that p $ E is by Lemma 50 equivalent to the existence of a P-preferredd 
extension E’ of (Z(D), W U 1, (D)) such that p $ E. Hence for all propositional variables 
p, p is in all PC-preferredd extensions of (D, W) if and only if p is in all P-preferredd 
extensions of (Z(D). W U Z,y(D)). 0 
5.4. Examples 
In this section we discuss the inheritance theories presented in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 in 
terms of their behavior on sample inheritance networks. The first example is the simplest 
inheritance network with a resolvable conflict between two defaults. 
Example 52. For the penguin triangle (Fig. 1) the translation in Section 5.2 yields 
the defaults D = {p:q/q, p:-r/-r, q:i/r] and the priority relation PG = {(p:-r/-r. 
q:r/r), (p:q/q,q:r/r)). For W = {p} the default theory (D, W) has exactly one PC- 
preferredd extension E = Cn( (p, q, -r}). 
In the above example, and in inheritance reasoning in general, a conflict between 
two defaults is solved in favor of the default that is more specific, that is, a default 
that states something about a smaller set of individuals than the conflicting default. The 
meaning of “smaller” as a subset has not satisfied researchers, and less strict definitions 
of “smaller” have been considered, yielding different definitions of preemption between 
paths. The inheritance network in Fig. 3 illustrates the difference between on-path and 
beer-drinker 
chaplain marine 
Bob 
Fig. 3. The marine chaplain 
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off-path preemption [ 111. With on-path preemption, the path Bob+ marine+ man-+ beer- 
drinker could be preempted only by a negative link that starts from a node that is on the 
path Bob+marine+man. Hence with on-path preemption the conflict between the links 
ending in the node beer-drinker is unresolved. Off-path preemption allows also the in- 
terference of links that are on some path between Bob and man, not necessarily on the 
path Bob+marine+man. With off-path preemption the path Bob-+marine-+man+beer- 
drinker is preempted by the link from chaplain to beer-drinker, and hence the conclu- 
sion not beer-drinker is obtained. Both on-path and off-path preemption have their pro- 
ponents [27]. The inheritance theories in the framework of prioritized default logic do not 
define a preemption relation between paths, and therefore they cannot directly be classified 
as on-path or off-path. Because the theories in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 assign a -F p a priority 
higher than b + -p whenever a is lower than b in the inheritance network irrespective of 
whether b can be derived by using a sequence of links involving a, they behave more like 
path-based theories with off-path preemption. 
Example 53. The inheritance network in Fig. 3 translates to the default theory AG = 
(D, W), where 
W = (chaplain, marine}, 
D= 
( 
chaplain : man marine : man 
man ’ man ’ 
chaplain : -beerdrinker man : -beerdrinker 
-beerdrinker ’ -beerdrinker . 
The priorities for AC are 
P, = 
chaplain : -beet-drinker man : beerdrinker 
-beerdrinker ’ 
chaplain : man man : beerdrinker 
man ’ ) beerdrinker ’ 
( 
marine : man man : beerdrinker 
man ’ iI beerdrinker 
The extension E = Cn((chaplain, marine, man, -beerdrinker}) is the only PG-preferredd 
extension of AC. 
A link in an inheritance network is redundant if it is obtained by combining a sequence 
of consecutive links the last of which is positive or negative and the others are positive. 
Different notions of preemption treat redundant links differently, and there is a controversy 
between the proponents of on-path and off-path preemption on how redundant links should 
affect inheritance [ 111. With our translations, redundant links can alter the behavior of an 
inheritance network. 
Example 54. Consider the inheritance network in Fig. 4. The translation of the inheritance 
network is the set of defaults D = (a:b/b, b:c/c, c:dld, b:-d/-d, a:d/d} and the 
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d 
strict partial order PC = (lb:-d/-d, c:d/d), (a:d/d, b:-d/-d), (b:c/c, c:d/d), (a:b/b, 
b:c/c)}. There are two extensions of (D,(a)), El = Cn({a, b,c,-d}) and E2 = 
a 
Fig. 4. A redundant link. 
a b 
Fig. 5. A simple inheritance network. 
Cn((a, b, c, d}). Only the extension E2 is Pc-preferredd, and hence (D, {a)) kGG d. 
The default theory (D’, {a)) without the redundant link a:d/d, where D’ = (a:b/b, 
6x/c, c:d/d, b:-d/-d], has the same extensions El and E2, but now only El is Ph- 
preferredd, where P& = {(b:-d/-d, c:d/d), (b:c/c, c:dld), (a:b/b, b:c/c)}. 
The inheritance theories in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 use defaults, respectively, with and 
without prerequisites. In the theory with prerequisite-free defaults links are represented as 
:p -+ /I/p -+ #I, and therefore reasoning by contraposition is possible. Hence, the negation 
of a prerequisite of a link may be derived when the conclusion is contradicted, and therefore 
these theories differ with respect to the negative literals they entail. 
Example 55. Fig. 5 depicts an inheritance network with two links that correspond to the 
defaults D = {a:c/c, b:-c/-c} (for the theory in Section 5.2) and D’ = (:a + c/a -+ c, 
:b -+ -c/b -+ T} (for the theory in Section 5.3.) The priority relations are empty. The 
default theory (D, (b}) has the extension E = Cn({b, lc}), and the default theory (D’, (b]) 
has the extension E’ = Cn((b, b-+ -c, a -+ c)). The difference concerning negative literals 
is that -a E E’\ E. 
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6. Related work on inheritance reasoning 
In this section we show that the inheritance theories by Gelfond and Przymusinska [ lo] 
and Brewka [4] are equivalent to the ones in Section 5. 
6.1. An inheritance theory by Geljond and Przymusinska 
Gelfond and Przymusinska [lo] present translations of inheritance networks to autoepis- 
temic logic [ 181. In Section 4b of their paper two formalizations of inheritance reasoning 
are given and proved equivalent. The first of these formalizations, defined for the class of 
good inheritance networks in Definition 43, uses prioritization that induces an ordering on 
the stable expansions of autoepistemic theories. In this section we show that Gelfond and 
Przymusinska’s inheritance theory is equivalent to the one presented in Section 5.2. 
Definition 56 (Autoepistemic logic). The language C ae of autoepistemic logic includes 
the formulae in C and is closed under the usual logical operators and the unary operator L. 
The consequence relation bae for autoepistemic formulae extends the logical consequence 
relation of classical propositional logic and treats formulae L@ like propositional variables. 
Sets E = (4 E C, I C U {Lg? E C,, I C#I E E] U {-I& E C,, I 4 $ El bae 4) are the stable 
expansions of C 2 C,,. 
Definition 57 (Translation). Let G = (V, E, P, N) be an acyclic inheritance network 
where V is finite. The translation Th(G) of G to autoepistemic logic consists of the 
following formulae: 
{H(~,c)~cEP}U(~H(X.C)~~EN]U 
W(c, PI I (c, P. 0) E EJ U W(c> p) I (c. P, 1) E EJ U 
W(C, p> I (c, P> 2) E El U {WC, PI I (~3 P, 3) E El U 
{ LPD(c, p) A LH(x, c) A lLab(x, c, p) + H(x, p) / c E V, p E V) U 
(LND(c, p) A LH(x, c) A -Lab@, c, p)+-H(x, p) I c E V, p E VI U 
(LPS(C,~)ALH(~,C)-,H(~,~)ICEV,~EV}U 
(LNS(c, p) A LH(x,c)+yH(x, p) 1 c E V, p f V). 
Definition 58 (Explanation). Let Th(G) be the translation of a finite and acyclic 
inheritance network G. A set X is an explanation, if X consists of formulae of the form 
ab(x, cl, ~2) and Th(G) U X has a consistent stable expansion. 
The purpose of an abnormality assumption ab(x, cl, Q) is to prevent inheritance of 
properties for x from c2 to cl. For an explanation X, the set of abnormality assumptions 
ab(x, cl, ~2) with c2 = a is denoted by X(a). The notion of explanation is motivated by 
the way inheritance networks G are translated to sets of formulae Th(G): conflicts between 
defeasible links are not resolved by formulae in Th(G), and in general Th(G) does not have 
stable expansions. If X is an explanation, then Th(G) U X has exactly one stable expansion. 
J. Rintanen /Artifciul Intelligence 106 (1998) 221-265 241 
Gelfond and Przymusinska define the relation better than on sets X(a) and the relation 
preferable on explanations. 4 
Definition 59 (Better than). Let X and X’ be explanations of an inheritance network G 
and c1 a node in G. Then X(a) is better than X’(a), if X(u) c X’(a), or X’(a) is non- 
empty 5 and for every ab(x. c. a) E X(a) there is ab(x, c’, a) E X’(a) and a non-empty 
positive path from c’ to c. 
Lemma 60. The relation better than is a strict partial order 
The preferability relation on explanations is defined in terms of the better than relation 
as follows. 
Definition 61 (Preferable). Let X and X’ be explanations for an inheritance network G. 
Then X is preferable to X’, if for some m > 0, 
(i) X(u) = X’(u) for all nodes a in G such that r(u) < m, 
(ii) for all a such that r(u) = m, X(u) = X’(u) or X(u) is better than X’(u), and 
(iii) for at least one a such that r(a) = m, X(u) is better than X’(u). 
An explanation X is a best explanation, if no explanation is preferable to X. 
The proof of the following lemma depends on the asymmetricity of better than 
Lemma 62 (Gelfond and Przymusinska [lo] ). The preferability relation is a strict partial 
order: 
We rephrase Gelfond and Przymusinska’s definitions in default logic. When E is an 
extension of a default theory (D, W), we denote by E(u) the set of defaults 6 E D such 
that def(d, E) and the conclusion of 6 is a or -a. 
Definition 63. Let G = (V, Ed, P, N) be an inheritance network and AC the translation 
of G as given in Definition 42. Let E and E’ be extensions of AG, and a E V. Then E(u) 
is better than E’(a), if E(u) c E’(a), or for each c:a/a! E E(u) there is c’:cr’/o’ E E’(u) 
such that there is a non-empty positive path from c’ to c in G and E’(a) is non-empty. 
Definition 64. Let G = (V, Ed, P, N) be an inheritance network and AC the translation 
of G as given in Definition 42. Let E and E’ be extensions of AC. Then E is preferable to 
E’, if for some m > 0, 
(i) E(u) = E’(u) for all a E V such that r(u) < m, 
(ii) for all a E V such that r(u) = m, E(u) = E’(u) or E(u) is better than E’(u), and 
4 In Proposition I in [IO], the relation p&ruble is claimed to be a preorder. In the proof it is stated that by 
preorder an asymmetric and transitive relation is meant. However, the proposition is in error: neither the relation 
better than on which preferable is based nor preferable, as defined on p. 412 in their paper, are asymmetric. Our 
results that follow use a corrected definition of better than. 
5 This non-emptiness requirement is missing in the Gelfond and Przymusinska definition. It is needed because 
if both X(a) and X’(a) were empty, then each would be better than the other. 
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(iii) for at least one a E V such that v(a) = m, E(a) is better than E’(a). 
An extension is a best extension, if no extension is preferable to it. 
The main result in this section is Theorem 73 that shows that the best extensions of a 
default theory are the preferredd extensions. The proof of this theorem consists of two 
parts. The first part shows that every preferredzd extension (and therefore also every 
preferredd extension) is a best extension. This proof is based on assuming that there 
is a better extension, and then constructing with Lemma 70 an extension that violates 
the preferrednesszd assumption. The proof of Lemma 70 uses Lemma 67 which in turn 
uses Lemma 66. In the second part of the proof of Theorem 73, for each best extension 
a AC, ?G-orderingd is constructed, which directly implies that best extensions are ?G- 
preferredd and PC -preferredzd. The proof of Theorem 73 and its lemmata operate strictly 
within default logic. The correspondence to the autoepistemic theories defined by Gelfond 
and Przymusinska is due to the next lemma. 
Lemma 65. Let G = (V, Ed, P, N) be an inheritance network and AC = (D, W) the 
translation of G as given in Definition 42. Let Th(G) be as given in Definition 57. 
If E is a best extension of AC, then there is a best explanation X of Th(G) such that 
for all links from cl to c2 in G and defaults S E {cl :c2/c2, cl :-Q/-Q}, def(6, E) if and 
only if ab(x, cl, ~2) E X. Furthermore, for all q E V, q E E if and only if H(x, q) E E’, 
where E’ is a stable expansion of Th(G) U X, and for all q E V, -q E E if and only if 
-H(x, q) E E’. 
If X is a best explanation of Th(G), then there is a best extension E of AG such thatfor 
ull links from cl to c2 in G and defaults 6 = cl IQ/Q or 6 = cl :-Q/-Q, def(d. E) if and 
only if ab(x, cl, ~2) E X. Furthermore, for all q E V, q E E if and only if H(x, q) E E’, 
where E’ is a stable expansion of Th(G) U X, and for all q E V, -q E E if and only if 
-H(x, q) E E’. 
Proof. The proof relies on the close correspondence between autoepistemic logic and 
default logic [ 131. The correspondence between best extensions and best explanations is 
due to the similarity of definitions of best. 0 
Lemmata 66 and 67 are used in Lemma 70 that is used in the first part of the proof of 
Theorem 73. These lemmata construct an extension respectively by adding and removing 
a set of normal defaults that are the upper part of an inheritance network. 
Lemma 66. Let G be an acyclic inheritance network and AG = (D U D’, W) the 
translation of G as given in Definition 42, and the propositional variables in conclusions 
of D’ do not occur in any prerequisite of a default in D, and defaults in D’ are normal. Let 
E be an extension of (D, W). Then there is an extension E’ of AG such that E E E’ and 
def(6, E’) implies def(6, E) for ~116 E D. 
Proof. Let 61, ,6, be a total ordering of D’ such that if r(&) < r(6j) then i < j. Such 
an ordering exists because G is acyclic. Let pi:Bi/Bi = 6; for all i E (1, . . . , n). Define 
Di = (61, , Si) U D for all i E (0, . , n). We construct a sequence of sets Bu, . , B, 
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and prove by induction that Cn(Bi) is an extension of (Di, W) for all i E (0, . , n). As 
the case i = II we obtain the fact that Cn(B,) is an extension of (D U D’, W). Define for 
alli E(O,...,n}. 
7 EGD(E, A) 
B, = Bi-I U I/%)* 
1 
if Bi_t t= p; and Bi_1 i&-j?i, 
I R;-I. otherwise. 
induction hypothesis: Cn(Bi) is an extension of (Di, W), and for all 6 E D, def(d, 
Cn(&)) implies def(6, Cn(Bo)). 
Base case i = 0: By assumption E is an extension of (0. W), and by Theorem 4 
Cn( Bo) = E, and by definition DO = D. 
Inductive cuse i > 1: By induction hypothesis Cn( Bi_1) is an extension of (Di_1, W). 
Assume Bi_1 + -/Ii. In this case Bi = B;_l By Lemma A.6 Cn(Bi) is an extension of 
(Di, W) = (0,-l U (Si], W). Assume B;-1 k pi. In this case B; = Bi-1. By Lemma A.7 
Cn(Bi) is an extension of (D;, W) = (Di_1 U {Si), W). Assume Bi_1 b pi and Bi-1 k 
-B;. In this case Bi = Bi_1 U {/f?i). By Lemma A.8 Cn(Bi) is an extension of (Di, W) 
because by assumption the conclusion of 6i is not the prerequisite of any default in D, 
and by definition of rank and Di the conclusion of 6i is not the prerequisite of any default 
in D;. 
Assume def(p:#J/p, Cn(Bi)) and p:#l//I E D. If Bi = Bi-1, then clearly def(p:/I//3. 
Cn(B;_t)) and by induction hypothesis def(p:jl/#?, Cn(Bu)). So assume Bi = Bi-1 U {/$I. 
Because Bi is a consistent set of literal& ,!I( is the only literal in Cn(Bi)\Cn(Bi_l). Now 
p # f3i because by assumption conclusions in D’ do not occur in prerequisites in D. Hence 
Bi-1 b p. Because Bi = Bi-1 U (/3i), /? # /Ii. Because pi # p, also Bi_1 b p. Hence 
def(p:B/#?. Cn(B;-I)). Therefore by the induction hypothesis def(p:jI/B, Cn(Bi)) implies 
def(p:B/#3, Cn(Bu)). This finishes the induction proof. Hence E’ = Cn(B,) is an extension 
of (D U D’. W) and def(6, E’) implies def(6. E) for all 6 E D. q 
Lemma 67. Let G be a good inheritance network and AC = (D U D’, W) the translation 
of G as given in Definition 42. Assume that the propositional vuriables in conclusions of 
D’ do not occur in any prerequisite of a default in D and the defaults in D’ are normal. 
Let E’ be an extension of (D U D’, W). Then there is an extension E of (0. W) such that 
,for all 6 E D, if def(d, E) then def(d, E’). 
Proof. E’ = Cnw({G E D U D’ 1 not def(S, E’))) by Definition 2 and Lemma A.4. Let 
D,d = (S E D 1 not def(d, E’)]. By Lemma A.2 Eo = Cnw(D,d) 2 E’. Let D, = {p:o/y E 
D,,d 1 p E Eo}.ByLemmaAS, Eoisanextensionof (Da, W) and D, =GD(Eu, (Da. W)). 
By repeated application of Lemma A.7 Eo is an extension of ( Dnd, W). Because Eo C E’, 
for all 6 E D, if def(b, Eo), then def(d, E’). By repeated application of Lemma A.6 EC) is 
an extension of (&d U D,j, W) where Dd = (8 E D 1 def(8, Eo)}. 
Claim A. For all p:o/y E D,d U &, p E E’ implies p E Eo. 
2.50 J. Rintanen /ArtiJicial Intelligence 106 (1998) 221-265 
Proof. The proof is by induction. Let Cb, C;, . . . be the sets in the definition of E’ = 
Cnw({S E DUD’ 1 not def(b, E’))) and Co, Cl,. . . the sets for Eo = Cnw((8 E D,d U D,j 1 
not def(d, Eo)]). Notice that for all 6 E Dnd U Dd, def(S, Eo) iff def(8, E’). 
Induction hypothesis: If p E Ci for p:a/y E D,d U Dd, then p E Ct. 
Base case i = 0: By definition CO = W = Ct. 
Inductive case i 3 1: Assume p E Ci for some p:o/y E D,d U Dd. If p E Ci_, 
then by induction hypothesis p E Ci_ 1 C Ci . If p E Ci\Ci_l, then Ci_) /= p’ for some 
p’:a’/p E (6 E D U D’ 1 not def(b, E’)}. Because by assumption propositional variables in 
conclusions of defaults in D’ do not occur in prerequisites of defaults in D, p’:a’/p E D. 
Because not def(p’:o’/p, E’), p’:a’/p E Dnd. Because G is good, by Lemma 45 E’ is 
consistent and its subset Ci_ 1 is consistent. Because Ci_, is a consistent set of literals and 
Ci_r /= p’, p’ E Cl_, . Hence by induction hypothesis p’ E C;_I . Because p’:a’/p E D,,d, 
pECi. Cl 
Claim B. p E Eoforall p:o/y E D\D,d 
Proof. Let p:a/y be any member of D\D,d. By definition def(p:a/y, E’) which implies 
p E E’. Hence p E W or there is p’:a’/p E GD(E’, Ac). In the first case p E Eo because 
W C Eo. Otherwise p’:o’/p E D, because of the disjointness of the propositional variables 
in the conclusions of D and the prerequisites in D’ and because p:a/y E D. Hence 
p’:o’/p E D,,d, and by Claim A p E Eo. 0 
Claim C. Defaults in D\(Dnd U L&j) are normal. 
Proof. Assume 6 E D\(&d U Dd). Because D\(&d U Dd) 2 D\D,d = D\{6 E D ) 
not def(S, E’)} = {S E D 1 def(S, E’)}, def(d, E’). Therefore 6 has at least one justification 
and is normal. q 
Claim D. The propositional variables in conclusions of defaults in D\(Dnd U Dd) do not 
occur in any prerequisite ofa default in D,d U Dd. 
_- 
Proof. First we show that for all ax/n E D\(&d U Dd) there is b:n/n E D’ n 
GD(E’, AC). Assumea:n/n E D\(D,dUDd). Because a:n/n E D\D,d, def(a:n/n, E’). 
-- 
Hence a A F E E’. Hence Ir E W or there is b:n/n E GD(E’, AC). By Claim B a E 
Eo. Because a:nln E D\&, not def(a:n/n, Eo), and hence ?Y +! Eo. Because W s 
-- 
Eo, 5 $ W. Hence there is 6:5/F E GD(E’, AC). Assume b:rr/n E D. Because not 
def(b:n/Z, E’), b:F/?F E Dnd. Hence by Claim A b E Eo. Because not def(b:n/?r, Eo), 
F E Eo. Because a E Eo, def(a:n/z, Eo), which contradicts the assumption that ax/n E 
-- 
D\Dn and hence not def(a:z/rr, Eo). Hence b:n/n E D’. Hence if ax/n E D\(Dnd U 
&), then there is b:?/F E D’. By the assumptions of the lemma the propositional variable 
in n does not occur in the prerequisite of any default in D. q 
By Claims C and D and Lemma 66 we get from the extension Eo of (Dnd U Dd, W) the 
extension E of (D, W) such that for all 6 E D, if def(S, E) then def(S, Eo). As def(b, Eo) 
implies def(6, E’) for all S E D, def(b, E) implies def(S, E’). q 
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Whenever all defaults with a rank less than some number are defeated in both of two 
extensions or in neither of them, then the conclusions of those defaults are in both of the 
extensions or in neither of them. 
Lemma 68. Let G be a good inheritance network and AC = (D, W) the translation of G 
as given in Dejinition 42. Let E and E’ be extensions of G such that E(p) = E’(p) for all 
p such that r(p) < n. Then for all p such that r(p) < n, p E E ifand only ifp E E’, and 
-p E E ifand only if-p E El. 
Proof. By induction on r(S) for S E D. q 
Lemma 69. Let G be a good inheritance network and AG = (D, W) the translation of G 
as given in Definition 42. Let E and E’ be extensions of G such that E(p) # E’(p) and 
E(q) = E’(q).for all q such that r(q) < r(p). If n E E, where r E {p, -p), then 77 E E’. 
Proof. Assume n E E. Because E(p) # E’(p) there is 6 = q:B/B E E(p) n E’(p). 
Hence q AB E E or q AB E E’. By Lemma 68 q E E f’ E'. If def(b, E, E’), B = K. Because 
not def(S, E’), n 4 E’ and by definition of extensions fi = F E E’. If def(6, E’, E), B E E’. 
Because q E E and not def(S, E), ,b = n. Hence F E E’. q 
Whenever an extension is preferable to another extension, the latter can be improved at 
those lowest rank nodes where the former is better than the latter without making unrelated 
nodes worse. 
Lemma 70. Let G = (V, Ed, P, N) be a good inheritance network and AG = (D, W) the 
translation of G as given in Definition 42. Let E and E’ be extensions of AG. Let n 3 0 be 
such that E(c) = E’(c) for all nodes c E V such that r(c) -C n. Let B = {b E V 1 E’(b) is 
better than E(b), r(b) = n). Let PG be the strict partial order on D given in Definition 46. 
Then there is an extension E” of AC such that E”(b) = E’(b) for all b E B, and def(6, E”) 
implies def(S, E) for all S E {S E D\DB 1 S’P& for no 6’ E Dn) where Dn = {p:a/y E 
D I b E B, y E {b. lb}). 
Proof. Define Dr. = (6 E D\Dn 1 S’P,6 for no 6’ E Dn}, DH = (6 E D\Dn ) 6’P~6 for 
some 6’ E DB]. D’s = (p:y/y E Dnl}, and Dg = (p:,/v E Dnl}. Clearly D = DL U DH U 
DgandDg=DbUDg. 
Claim A. If q:/B E D and ,t? E (a, -a} for some a E V such that r(a) = n and E(a) # 
E’(a), then q $ E U E’. 
Proof. Because E(a) # E’(a), there is p:n/n E D such that n E (a, -a} and def(p:n/n, 
E. E’) (proof for the case def(p:n/n, E’, E) is similar). Therefore F E E. By Lemma 69 
n E El. Because G is good, by Lemma 45 n $ E and iF $ E’. Because q:/B E D 
and /I E {a, -a), by definition of extensions either q 4 E or q $ E’. By Lemma 68 
q$EUE’. •I 
Claim B. For all b E B, either b E E or -b E E. 
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Proof. Let b be any member of B. Hence E(b) # E’(b). Hence there is 6 = p:n/n E D 
with rr E (6, -b} such that def(6, E, E’) or def(S, E’, E). Hence either (p, Z) c E or 
(p,F) C E’. If (p,F) E E, then we are done. Otherwise (p.F} g E’. By Lemma 68 
p E E. Because E is an extension of (D, W) and p E E and not def(p:n/n, E), 77 $ E. 
By the definition of extensions n E E. q 
Claim C. Defaults in DH are normal. 
Proof. Let 6 be a member of Dn . By definition there is 6’ E Dn such that ~“PG&, that is, 
there is a path from the propositional variable in the conclusion of S’ to the prerequisite of 8. 
Because 6’ E Dn there is 8” E Dn such that 6’ and 8” have the same propositional variable 
in their conclusions and 8” E E(p) a E’(p). Now 8” is normal because it is defeated in an 
extension. Because there is a path from the propositional variable in the conclusion of 8” 
to the prerequisite of 6 and G is good, 8 is normal. q 
By repeated applications of Lemma A.7 (justified by Claim A) E is an extension of 
( DL U Dn U Dk, W) . Because defaults in DL are normal by definition and defaults in 
DH are normal by Claim C, and the propositional variables in conclusions of defaults in 
DH U Dk do not occur in the prerequisites of DL (that would contradict the definitions 
of PC, DH and DL), by Lemma 67 there is an extension El of ( DL , W) such that for all 
6 E DL, def(8, El) implies def(6, E). Let E2 = Cn(Et U I) where I = E’ n (B U 1-p 1 
p E B]). Because members of B do not occur in DL, def(b, E2) implies def(b, El) for all 
6 E DL. That E2 is an extension of ( DL U Dh. W) is by an induction proof that is based on 
the fact that for every formula in I there is a generating default with the conclusion in I and 
the precondition in El. By repeated applications of Lemma A.7 (justified by Claim A) E2 
is an extension of ( DL U Dk U Dg , W). Because defaults in DH are normal by Claim C, by 
Lemma 66 there is an extension E” of (D, W) such that E2 C E” and def(b, E”) implies 
def(b, E2) for all 6 E DL. Because def(S, E”) implies def(d. E2) implies def(S, Et) implies 
def(S, E) for all S E DL, def(6, E”) implies def(S, E) for all 6 E DL. 0 
Lemma 71. Let G be a good inheritance network and AC = (D. W) the translation of G 
as given in Definition 42. Let E and E’ be extensions of A,. Let P, be the strict partial 
order given in Definition 46. Let a be a node in G such that E(a) is better than E’(a), 
and E (6) = E’(b) for all b such that r(b) < r(a), Then def(6, E’, E) for all PG-minimal 
6 E E(a) n E’(a). 
Proof. Assume 6 E E(a) n E’(a) and def(S, E, E’). We show that 6 is not PC-minimal. 
Because E(a) is better than E’(a), there is 6’ E E’(a) and a non-empty positive path from 
the prerequisite of 6’ to the prerequisite S. As the prerequisite of 6 is in E, by Lemma 68 
it is also in E’. Hence appl(S, E’) and def(6’, E’), and the conclusions of S and S’ are 
complementary. Therefore by definition S’PcS. Hence S’ 6 E(u) and 6’ E E(a) n E’(u). 
Therefore 6 is not PC-minimal. IJ 
Lemma 72, Let P be a strict partial order on a jinite set U. Let S be a subset of U such 
that P n (S x S) = fl. Let PI and P2 be sets such that PI U P2 = S and PI n P2 = lil. Then 
the transitive closure of P U (PI x P2) is asymmetric, and therefore a strict partial order: 
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Theorem 73. Let G = (V, Ed, P, N) be a good inheritance network and AC = (D, W) 
the translation of G as given in Dejinition 42. Let P, be the strict partial order on D given 
in Definition 46. Then,for ever?: extension E of AG, E is PG -pr<ferredd (PC -pwferredzd) 
if and only [f E is best. 
Proof. Let E be a PG-preferredzd extension of AG and assume that there is an extension 
E’ of AG that is preferable to E. By Definition 64 there is n such that E(c) = E’(c) for 
all nodes c such that u(c) < n, and E’(c) is better than E(c) or E’(c) = E(c) for all c 
such that r(c) = n, and for some a such that r(a) = n, E’(a) is better than E(a). Let 
B = {b E V 1 E’(b) is better than E(b). r(b) = n). This set is non-empty because a E B. 
Let DB = {p:a/y E D 1 b E B, y E {b, -6)). By Lemma 70 there is an extension E” of 
(D, W) such that E’(b) = E”(b) for all b E B, and def(b, E”) implies def(d, E) for all 
6 E DL where DL = [S E D\DB ) 6’P& for no 6’ E De]. 
Let ‘T be any strict total order on D such that PC C 1. Let 6 be the I-least element of 
D such that def(S, E, E”) or def(d, E”, E). If 6 E DL, then def(b, E, E”) as def(S, E”) 
implies def(6, E) for members of DL. If 6 E E(b) n E”(b) for some b E B, then by 
Lemma 71 def(S, E, E”). This exhausts all possible I-least S E D such that def(d, E, E”) 
or def(S, E”, E), because for all 6’ E D\(DL U DB) there is 6” E Dg such that ~“PGc?‘. The 
conclusion that def(S, E, E”) and def(6’. E) iff def(6’, E”) for all 6’16, contradicts the fact 
that E is PG-prefeiredzd. Hence the assumption that there is an extension that is preferable 
to E is false, and all PG-preferredzd extensions are best extensions. By Lemma 14 all PG - 
preferredd extensions are PG-preferredzd extensions and therefore best extensions. 
The second direction, that is, every best extension is a PG-preferredd extension, is as 
follows. 
Assume E is a best extension of AC. A node p is a d-node (with respect to E’), if for an 
extension E’, E(q) = E’(q) for all q such that r(q) < r(p) and E(p) # E’(P) and E’(P) 
is not better than E(p). We construct a strict partial order P on D such that PG C P and 
p:/3//3Pp’:/3’//3’, where fl E {c, -c} and p’ E {c’, Y’}, whenever 
(i) r(c) < I, 
(ii) r(c) = r(c’) and c is a d-node and c’ is not, or 
(iii) p:B//3 and p’:j!I’/b’ are PG-minimal in (p:b/b E D / p E E, ,8 E {c, -cl} and 
appl(p$/B, E) and def(p’:/Y/#?‘, E). 
Let PI be the transitive closure of PG U ( (6.6’) E D x D 1 r(6) < r (6’)). The relation 
PI is asymmetric because 6’P,J for no defaults such that r(6) c r(S’). Let P, be the 
transitive closure of Pr U ((~?,a’) E D x D / 6 = p:B//I, 8’ = p’:B’/jI’, r(6) = ~(a’), /I E 
{b, lb), /I’ E (b’, lb’), b is a d-node. b’ is not a d-node]. The relation P2 is asymmetric 
by Lemma 72 and because PI does not relate defaults of the same rank that have 
different propositional variables in their conclusions. Define A,. = (p:/I/B E D I p E 
E, B E (c, T)) for every c E V. Let P be the transitive closure of P2 U { (&,a’) I c E 
V, S and S’ are PC-minimal in A,., appl(S, E), def(b’. E)). Because P2 does not relate P,- 
minimal members of A,, P is asymmetric by repeated applications of Lemma 72 with 
PI = (8 is PG-minimal in A, I appl(8, E)} and P2 = (8 is PG-minimal in A, 1 def(b, E)}. 
Let 7 be any strict total order on D such that P C 7. 
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Claim A. Let p be a member of V, and E, E’ and El’ consistent extensions of AG. 
If E(p) # E’(p) and E(p) # E”(p) and E(q) = E’(q) = E”(q) for all q such that 
r(q) < r(p), then E’(p) = E”(p). 
Proof. Assume a:n/n E E”(p). Hence a A F E E”. Hence by Lemma 69 n E E and 
3 E E’. By Lemma 68 a E E’. Hence a:rr/n E E’(p). Therefore E”(p) 2 E’(p). By 
symmetry E’(p) C E”(p). Hence E’(p) = E”(p). 0 
Claim B. Let p be a d-node with respect to an extension E’. Then for all 6 E E(p)\ E’(p) 
there is 6’ E E’(p)\E(p) such that 6’PS. 
Proof. Because E’(p) is not better than E(p), there is So E E’(p)\E(p) such that there 
is no 61 E E(p)\E’(p) with a non-empty positive path from the prerequisite of 61 to the 
prerequisite of 60. Because def(&, E’), a0 E E’ where 60 = ao:n/n. By Lemma 68 au E E. 
If there is 62 E E’(p)\ E (p) and a non-empty positive path from the prerequisite of S2 to au 
(let the path be maximal), then let 83 = 82, otherwise let S3 = So. Clearly 83 is PG-minimal 
in A,. Hence&P& by the definition of P, and 83 E E’(p)\E(p). q 
Claim C. Let E’ be any extension of AG such that E’ # E. There is 6 = a:n/n E D such 
that def(6, E’, E) and n is a d-node. 
Proof. Let n be the least number such that E(p) = E’(p) for all p such that r(p) < n. 
Because E’ is not preferable to E, E(p) # E’(p) and E’(p) is not better than E(p) for 
some p such that r(p) = n. Now p is a d-node for E with respect to E’. By the definition 
of better than there is S E E’(p)\E(p), that is, def(b, E’, E). q 
Let E’ be any extension of A, such that E’ # E. By Claim C there is 6 = a:n/n 
with the given properties. Assume def(d’, E, E’) for some 6’ = a’:n’/n’ E D such that 
rr’ E {p, -p}. If r(n’) > r(n), then by definition 6PS’. Otherwise r(n’) = r(n). If p is 
not a d-node, then by definition 6PS’. Hence assume that p is a d-node. By Claim A 
p is a d-node with respect to E’. By Claim B there is 6”PS’ such that 6” E E’(p)\E(p). 
Therefore for all 6’ such that def(b’, E, E’) there is 6”PS’ such that def(b”, E’, E). Because 
P c 7, also 6”7S’. As this holds for any E’, 7 is a AG, PG-orderingd for E. Because E 
is a PG-preferredd extension of A,, by Lemma 14 E is a PC-preferredzd extension of 
AC;. q 
The theorem shows that Gelfond and Przymusinska’s inheritance theory coincides with 
the inheritance theory presented in Section 5 both with PG-preferredd and PG -preferredzd 
extensions. 
6.2. An inheritance theory by Brewka 
Brewka [4] presents a translational inheritance theory that is based on predicate logic 
and circumscription [ 171. The theory is about the class of inheritance networks with the 
following properties. Defeasible links may not be followed by any links and a defeasible 
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link and a strict link may not end in the same node. All strict links are positive. These 
restrictions correspond to a division of nodes to classes and properties. All links between 
classes are strict and positive, and all links from classes to properties are defeasible. No 
link starts from a property node. 
Definition 74 (Class-property network). Let G = (V, E, P, N) be a good inheritance 
network. Then G is a class-property network, if there is a set C 5 V such that E C 
(C x C x {2}) U (C x (V\C) x (0, 1)). The members of C are the classes and the members 
of V\C are the properties in G. 
Brewka allows non-Boolean properties, that is, instead of only two kinds of links- 
positive and negative-there may be arbitrarily many different kinds of links from classes 
to properties. In this section we show that Brewka’s inheritance theory coincides with 
the one given in Section 5.3. We consider only the Boolean case, and assume that 
inheritance networks have only one individual U. We give a translation from our definition 
of inheritance networks to Brewka’s translation. Brewka’s representation of inheritance 
networks uses a Lisp-like notation that is not used here. 
Let G = (V, E, P, N) be a class-property network. Let C be the classes in G. Links in 
E are translated as follows [4]. 
Qc = (HasSlot(x, y, T) / (x, y, 0) E E] U 
WasSloth, y, 0 I lx, Y, 1) E El U 
(Specializes(x, y) 1 (x, y, 2) E E}. 
An individual may be a member of a class, and an individual may have or not have a 
property. We have only one individual U. 
Oi = (Holds(p, U, T) 1 p E P\C) U 
WolWp, U, F) I p E N\CJ U 
Mu, C) I c E P n c}. 
No two symbols refer to the same class or property. 
In addition to the above formulae that depend on the inheritance networks, the set @b of 
formulae below is needed. These formulae state the following. The class-inclusion relation 
Specializes propagates class-membership. Class-inclusion is transitive. If an individual that 
is a member of a class is not exceptional with respect to a property associated with the class, 
then the individual has the default value of the property. An individual is exceptional with 
respect o a property associated with a class if there is a subclass of the class with a different 
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value for the same property and the individual belongs to that subclass. An individual may 
not have two different values for a property. 
VxVy(Specializes(x, y) + (Is(U, x) + Is(U, y))) 
VxVyVz(Specializes(x, y) A Specializes(y, z)+ Specializes(x, z)) 
VxVyVu(HasSlot(x, y, u) A Is(U, x) A -Exceptional(U, x, y)+Holds(y, U, u)) 
VxtVx~VvtVu~Vz(Is(U, x1) A HasSlot(xt, z, VI) A Specializes(x), x2) A 
HasSlot(x2, z, v-J A ut # u2 + Exceptional(U, x2, z)) 
VxVvlVu2(Holds(x. U. ~1) A HoIds(x. U, v2)+vl = ~2). 
Brewka says that Exceptional is circumscribed in Q, = QC U Oi U Ou U @b and all other 
predicates in CD are varied. The notation M(S) denotes the interpretation of the predicate 
symbol S in the model M. A definition of circumscription with varied predicates is given 
in [ 151. Let Z1, . . , Z, be the predicates to be varied while circumscribing P in @ The 
result @circ of circumscribing P in @ with other predicates varied is the second-order 
formula~~~3pz~~~~z~(~(p,z~,...,z~)~~~P)where~(p,z1,...,z,)islike~ 
but occurrences of P have been replaced by p and occurrences of Zi have been replaced 
by z; for all i E (1, . . , n}, and p < P is defined as (p 6 P) A -(p = P) where p = P 
stands for V.x(p(x) = P(x)) and p < P stands for Vx(p(x)+ P(x)). 
Lemma 75. Let G = (V, E, P, N) be a class-property network. Let @ be the translation 
of G as defined by Brewka. Let M be a model such that M b @. Then there is a model M’ 
such that M’ b @ and M’(Exceptiona1) = M(Exceptiona1) and M’(Holds) = M(Holds), 
andforall x and y and z, M’ b Specializes(x, y, z) if and only if @ b Specializes(x, y, z), 
andfor all x and y, M’ + Is(x, y) if and only if 0 + Is(x. y), and for all x and y and z, 
M’ b HasSlot(x, y, z) ifand only if@ b HasSlot(x, y, z), 
Lemma 76. Let G = (V, E, P. N) be a class-property network with classes C C V. Let 
@ be the translation of G as defined by Brewka. Let AC = (D, W) be the translation of’G 
as given in Definition 42. Then for all p E C, W U t,(D) b p tf and only [f 0 + Is( U, p) 
(I, is defined in Section 5.3). 
The following two lemmata both prove a half of the equivalence between membership, 
respectively, of p and lp in an extension and the truth of Holds(p, U, T) and 
Holds(p, U, F) in a model of @‘circ. 
Lemma 77. Let G = (V, Ed, P, N) be a class-property network with classes C C V. Let 
@ be the translation of G as defined by Brewka. Let @circ be the result of circumscribing 
Exceptional in @ with otherpredicates varied. Let AC = (D, W) be the translation of G as 
given in Definition 42 and let QG be the priorities for AG as given in Definition 46. Let A = 
(I(D), W U I,(D)) and Q = ((:p-tBlp-+B, :p’--+Bflp’+Bf) I P:@/@QGP’$‘/B’) (1 
and 1, are de@ned in Section 5.3). Let M be a model of @circ. Then there is a Q-preferredd 
extension E of A such that for all p E V\C, if p E E then M b Holds(p, U, T), and if 
-p E E then M + Holds@, U, F). 
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Proof. Because G is good and therefore acyclic, by Lemma 47 PC is a strict partial 
order. Assume there is model M such that M + @circ. Because of the unique names 
axioms Qn, we can assume that constant symbols are interpreted as themselves in M. 
Let M’ be the model given in Lemma 75. Define A/, = (:q + y/q -+ y E I(D) ( y E 
{h, lb], @ + Is(U, q)} for all b E V. Define PI as the transitive closure of the relation PO 
definedas :p~,H/p~B’po:p’~B’/p’~B’whenever :pjBjp-,BP:p"B'/p'~B' 
or ~4 = p and :p -+ B/p + fi and :p’ + fi’/p’ -+ /3’ are ‘P-minimal elements in & 
and M’ k Exceptional(U, p, b) and M’ /= Exceptional(U, p’, b’). By Lemma 72 PI is 
asymmetric and therefore a strict partial order. 
Let 7 be any strict total order on l(D) such that ‘PI 2 7. Let :& /@I, . . , :& /@,, 
be the ordering 7 on Z(D). Construct So. . , S, and the preferred subtheory S = S, of 
(14 1 x$/4 E Z(D)}, W U 1,$(D), ((4,1//) 1 :@/c$P:+/@}) by using Definition 27 with the 
strict total order 41, . , & 
Induction hypothesis: 
(i) For all p E C, p E Cn(Si) if and only if @ + Is(U, p). 
(ii) For all j E (1, . . . , i), if :pj + /Ij/pj + Bj is ‘P-minimal in Abj for bj E V, then 
pj + /Yj E Si if and only if M’ k Exceptional(U, pj , bj). 
(iii) For all p E V\C, if S; + p then M’ + Holds(p, I/. T), and if Si C_ -p then 
M’ l= Holds(p. U, F). 
Base case i = 0: 
(i) By Lemma 76 for all p E C, p E Cn(Sa) if and only if @ l= Is(U, p). 
(ii) Immediate as there are no j E ( 1, . . , 0). 
(iii) Because G is good, the union of W and the consequents of the implications 
in Z,(D) is consistent by Lemma 44. Therefore So = W U Z,(D) is consistent. 
Assume SO + p and p E V\C. If p E W, then by definition p E P. By 
definition Holds(p, U, T) E @. Hence M’ /= Holds(p, U, Z’). Because there are 
no occurrences of p E V\C in Z,(D) and So is consistent, there is no p such that 
p $ W and So + p. The case SO b -p is similar. 
Inductive case i 3 1: 
(i) Assume p E Cn(Si) n C. If Si_t U {pi + fi;) is inconsistent and hence Si = Si-1, 
then the result is immediate by the induction hypothesis. If Si = Si-t U {pi -+ fii ), 
then by Lemma A.10 pi is the only literal that may be in Cn(Si)\Cn(S’_l). Because 
the propositional variable bi in /Ii is in V\C, p # hi. Hence p E Cn(Si_I). Hence 
by induction hypothesis r9 + Is( U, p). 
Assume @ + Is(U. p). By induction hypothesis p E Cn(S;_I). Because Si-t c Si, 
p E Cn(Si) by the monotonicity of Cn. 
(ii) We prove the contrapositions of both halves of the equivalence. For j E { 1, . , 
i - 1) the result is immediate by the induction hypothesis. It remains to consider 
the case i = j. So assume :pi + pi/pi -+ #li is p-minimal in &, Assume p; + 
Bi $! Si. Hence S; = Si- 1 and Si-t b pi A -/Ii. Hence by item (i) of the induction 
hypothesis @ b Is(U, pi) and hence M’ /= Is(U, pi), and by item (iii) M’ + 
Holds(bi, U, T) if ~9i = -bi and M’ l= Holds(bi, U, F) if /Ii = bi. Because :p; + 
/$/pi+fliEZ(D), (pi,bi,O)EEdif/Ii=bi and(pi,bi,l)EEdifBi=-bi. 
Therefore HasSlot(p;, b;. T) E @ if pi = hi and HasSlot(pi, bi, F) E @ if B; = 
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-bi. Because VxVyVv(HasSlot(x, y, v) A Is(U, X) A -Exceptional(U, X, y) -+ 
Holds(y, U, u)) E @ and M’ b @, finally M’ t= Exceptional(U, pi, bi). 
Assume that M’ + Exceptional(U, pi, bi). In the following we assume that /?i = 
bi; the proof for the case /?i = -bi is almost identical. 
Claim A. @ t= Is(U, pi) A HasSlot(pi, bi, T). 
Proof. By assuming the opposite and deriving the non-minimality of M’. q 
We analyze by cases. 
(a) Consider the case where for some q E V, :q + @i/q -+ E is P-minimal 
in Abi and M’ k Exceptional(U,q,b;). Because :pi -+ pi/pi + /3i is P- 
minimal in &, , by definition :q -+ @i/q -+ /?iPl:pi + pi/pi + pi. Hence 
q + /$ = pj -+ Bj for some j < i. Because M’ k Exceptional(U, q, bi), by 
item (ii) of the induction hypothesis q + /3i E Si_1. Because Si-1 b q by 
the definition of Ahi and item (i) of the induction hypothesis, Si-1 /Z E. By 
Claim A and item (i) of the induction hypothesis, pi E Cn(,S_1). Therefore 
Si- 1 U (pi + pi) is inconsistent and pi + /?i $ Si . 
(b) Consider the case where @ b Holds(bi, U, F). NOW bi E N and -bi E W c 
Si_1. By Claim A and item (i) of the induction hypothesis pi E Cn(Si_1). 
Therefore Si _ 1 U {pi + pi) is inconsistent and pi + /?i $ Si . 
(c) We show that the assumptions of (a) and (b) cannot both be false. So 
we assume they are and derive a contradiction with the fact M’ + Qcj,. 
We construct a model M” such that M” /= 4 and M”(Exceptiona1) c 
M’(Exceptiona1). Let the universe of M” be V U (U, T, F] and constant 
symbols are interpreted as themselves. Let 
M”(Exceptiona1) = M’(Exceptional)\{ (U, pi, bi)}, 
M”(Holds) = M’(Holds)\( (hi, U, F)} U ((bi, U, T)}, 
M”(P) = M’(P) for all other predicate symbols P. 
The proof that M” /= 0 is by analyzing all formulae in @. 
(iii) Assume p E V\C and Si b p (the proof for -p is similar). Assume Si-1 U [pi + 
pi} is inconsistent. Hence 5’i = .S_1 and the result is immediate by induction 
hypothesis. SO assume Si = Si_1 U (pi -+ pi). By Lemma A.10 Bi is the only 
propositional variable possibly in Cn(&)\Cn(S;_l). Hence the result for all p 
such that p # #Ii is immediate by the induction hypothesis, and it suffices to 
consider the case p = /Ii. If /3i E Cn(Si_ 1)) then the result is immediate by the 
induction hypothesis. Otherwise Bi E Cn($)\Cn(si_l), and pi E Cn(Si-1) by 
Lemmata A.9 and A.lO. By item (i) of the induction hypothesis M’ + Is(U, pi). 
Because :pi +Bi/pi -+B; E Z(D), (pi,bi,O) E Ed. Hence HasSlot(pi,bi, T) E 
@. (1) If :pi + #Ii/pi -+ /3i is P-minimal in Ah,, then by item (ii) above 
M’ k Exceptional(U, pi, bi). Because M’ + 0 and M’ + Is(U, pi) and M’ b 
VxVyVu(HasSlot(x, y. u) A Is(U, x) A lExceptional(U, X, y) -+ Holds(y, U, u)), 
M’ + Holds(bi. U, T). (2) If :p; + /$/pi + #$ is not p-minimal in &, then 
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thereis :pj+Bj/pj+BjP:pi + /?i /pi + fii in Ab, . By the definition of Ahi and 
item (i) of the induction hypothesis pj E Cn(.S_1). By definition of PC, /Jj = /?;. 
Now p,j + Bj # Si-t because otherwise Si- 1 U (pi A /$} would be inconsistent. 
Because pj -+ @j $ Si-1, Si-1 + pi. By item (iii) of the induction hypothesis 
M’ b Holds(bi, U, T). 
By definition S = S, is a preferred subtheory of ((4 I :c#I/$ E Z(D)}, W U Zs(D), ((6, I/I) I 
:#/#P:@/@)). By Theorem 33 and the fact that for prerequisite-free defaults appl(d, E) 
is equivalent to not def(d, E), E = Cn(S) is a P-preferredd extension of A = (Z(D), W U 
l,(D)). By item (iii) of the induction hypothesis and because M(Holds) = M’(Holds), 
for all p E V\C, if p E E then M l= Holds(p, U, T), and if lp E E then M l= 
Holds(p, U, F). KI 
Lemma 78. Let G = (V, Ed, P, N) be a class-property network with classes C & V. Let 
@ be the translation of G as defined by Brewka. Let @circ be the result of circumscribing 
Exceptional in @ with otherpredicates varied. Let AC = (D, W) be the translation of G as 
given in Dejinition 42 and let PG be the prioritiesfor AC as given in Dejinition 46. Let A = 
(I(D), WUI,(D))andP=((:p-,B/p~B,:p’~B’/p’~B’) Ip:~/~Pcp’:/3’//3’).Let 
E be a P-preferredd extension of A. Then there is a model M such that M /= @circ andfor 
all p E V\C, if p +! E then M E Holds(p, U, T). 
Proof. Because G is acyclic, by Lemma 47 PC is a strict partial order. We construct a 
model M such that M + @circ and directly by construction for all p E V\C, if p $ E 
then M &t Holds(p, U, T). The universe of M is V U (U, T, F), the constant symbols 
V U [U. T, FJ are interpreted as themselves, and the predicate symbols are interpreted as 
follows. 
M(Specializes) = {(x, y) E C x C 1 @ + Specializes(x, y)}, 
M(HasSlot) = {(x, y, u) E C x (V\C) x {T, F} I 0 + HasSlot(x, y, u)}, 
M(ls) = {(U, x) 1 x E C, @ b Is(U, x)}. 
M(Exceptiona1) = (U, p, b) 1 5 .I(U,,pt{b,lbj,def(~,E)J 
U ( (U, p, b) I p E C. b E V \C, @ + Exceptional(U, p, 6) ) . 
M(Holds)=~(x,U,T)~x~E,x~V\C]U((x,U,F)~~x~E,x~V\C). 
The triples {(U, p, b) I p E C, b E V\C, @ + Exceptional(U, p, 6)) in M(Exceptiona1) 
are needed because @b makes exceptional all links that are less specific than contradicting 
links the antecedents of which are entailed by 0, even when the contradicting links are 
exceptional. 
We first show that M b Qc U @i U @b U Qu and then that M k @circ. Formulae 
in Qc U @i U @, are immediate. Formulae VxVy(Specializes(x, y) -+ (Is(U, x) + 
Is(U, y))), VxVyVZ(Specializes(x, y) ASpecializes(y, 2) + Specializes(x) z)) , and Vx 1 Vx2 
VutVu~Vz(Is(U, xl) A HasSlot(xt, Z, III) A Specializes(x1, x2) A HasSlot(x2, z, ~2) A ut # 
u2 -+ Exceptional(U, x2, z)) are true in M directly because their antecedents are true if and 
only if they are logical consequences of @, and then so are the consequents. 
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Consider VxVyVv(HasSlot(x, y, u) A Is(U, x) A -Exceptional(U, x, y) + Holds(y, U, 
u)) E @b. Assume M + HasSlot(x, y, v) A Is(U, x) A -Exceptional(U, x, y) for some 
x e C, y E V\C and u E (T, F} (we give the proof for IJ = F, proof for u = T is similar). 
Hence HasSlot(x, y, F) E Qc and (x, y, 1) E Ed. By definition @ + Is(U, x) and hence 
by Lemma 76 x E E. By definition of M (Exceptional) not def(:x + -y/x + -y , E). Now 
-y E E, and by definition M + Holds(y, U, F). 
Consider VxVvtVv2(Holds(x. U, ~1) A Holds(x, U, u2)+t~l = ~2) E @b. Assume M + 
Holds(x, U, ~1) A Holds(x. U, ~2) for some x, ut and 112. By definition (~1, IQ} E (T, F}. 
Assume ui # ~2. Then x E E and -x E E by the definition of M, which contradicts the 
consistency of E (Lemma 44 and Corollary 2.2 in [22]). Hence ~1 = u2 and M /= ~1 = ~2. 
It remains to show that the second conjunct of (Pcirc is true in M. This formula says 
that there are no models M’ such that M’ t= @ and M’(Exceptiona1) c M(Exceptiona1). 
Assume there is such a model M’. Define Q = W U Z, (D) U {p + /I I :p + /3/p -+ /3 E 
I(D), /3 E {b, lb), (U, p, b) $ M’(Exceptional)}. 
Claim A. Q is consistent. 
Proof. Let M” be a propositional model such that M” + p if and only if p E C and M’ /= 
Is(U, p) or p E V\C and M’ + Holds(p, U, T). We show that M” b Q. Assume -p E W. 
Hence p E N, Holds(p, U, F) E @, M’ + Holds(p, U. F), M’ k Holds(p, U, T), and 
M” k p. Assume p E W. Hence p E P, Holds(p, U, T) E @ if p E V\C andIs(U, p) E @ 
if p E C, M’ /= Holds(p, U, T) if p E V\C and M’ /= Is(U, p) if p E C, and finally 
84” /= p. Assume q + q’ E Z,(D). Hence (q, q’, 2) E Ed and Specializes(q, q’) E @. 
Assume M” + q. Hence M’ + Is(U, q). Because M’ t= Specializes(q, q’) and M’ b 
VxVy(Specializes(x, y) -+ (Is(U, x) + Is(U. y))), M’ /= Is(U, q’), and hence M” + q’ 
and M” + q -+q’. Assume p-+ /3 E Q\fs(D). Hence M’ k Exceptional(U, p, b) for B E 
(h, -h] and M’ b HasSlot(p, h, T) (we assume that /I = b; the case ,8 = -b is similar). 
Assume M” t= p. Hence M’ + Is(U, p). Because M’ b VxVyVv(HasSlot(x, y, v) A 
Is(U, x) A -Exceptional(U. x. y) + Holds(y, U. v)), M’ + Holds(b, U, T) and M” l= 
B. 13 
Claim B. Let b be a member of V\C. For at1 P-minimal :q + B/q -+ /? E Ah, (U, q, b) E 
M(Exceptiona1) ifand only .f q + j3 $ E. 
Claim C. Ifb E E for b E V\(C U P), then there is a T-minimal default :q + b/q + b E 
Absuchthatq+bE E. 
Claim D. E = Cn(W U Z,y(D) U F) where F = (p-+/3 1 :p-+/3/p+b E I(D),B E 
(b, lb), (Cl, p, b) 6 M(Exceptiona1)). 
Proof. First we show 2. By definition W U I,(D) c E. Assume that :p -+ /3/p + 
/3 E I(D) and B E {b, -b} and (U, p, b) $ M(Exceptiona1). Because of the last fact, 
not def(:p -+ B,/p -+ B, E). Hence by definition of extensions p + @ E E. Then we 
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show 2. By Lemma A.1 E = Cn(S) where S = W U &(D) U {p + b ( :p --f /3/p + 
fl E Z(D), not def(:p + p/p + /I, E)}. We show that W U 1.7(D) U F /= 4 for all 
$I E S. For formulae in W U I,(D) the result is immediate. Assume :p + /I/p -+ B E 
I(D) and not def(:p + /I/p + /I, E). If @ !+= Exceptional(U, p,b), then (U. p,b) $ 
M(Exceptional), and by definition p+ p E F. Otherwise @ + Exceptional(U, p, b). The 
following formulae in @b have occurrences of Exceptional: VxVyVv(HasSlot(x, y, u) A 
Is(U, x) A -Exceptional(U, x. y) + Holds(y, U, u)) and VxtVx2VutVv2Vz(Is(U, XI) A 
HasSlot(xt , z, ~1) A Specializes(x1 ,x2) A HasSlot(x2, Z, ~2) A ut # u2 -+ Exceptional(U, 
x2. z)). Assume that B = b (the case /3 = -b is similar). Therefore @ k HasSlot(p, b, T) 
A ((Is(U. p) A -Holds(b. U. T)) v (Is(U, x) A HasSlot(x, b, F) A Specializes(x, p))) for 
some x. Because M k -Holds(b, U, T), M /= Is(U, x) A HasSlot(x. b, F) A Specializes 
(x, p) for some x Therefore 
(1) @J ~Is(U,x)andbyLemma76 WUI,(D) /=x, 
(2) @ /= HasSlot(x, 6, F), and because HasSlot occurs only positively in Qbc, by 
definition (x, y, 1) E Ed and :x-+-b/x--+-b E I(D), and 
(3) @ b Specializes(x, p) and hence :x + -b/x + -bP:p -+ b/p + 6. 
Because (x, p) C Cn(W U I,(D)) C E, :p + b/p -+ b is in Ah but not P-minimal. By 
Claim C there is P-minimal :q -+ b/q -+ b E At, such that q + b E E. By Claim B 
(U. q, b) $ M(Exceptiona1). Hence q --f b E F by definition. Because q E E and hence 
inCn(WUZ.~(D)),finallyCn(WUI,~(D)UF)~p--+b. 0 
By Claim D E = Cn( W U 1, (D) U F). Clearly W U I,(D) U F g Q. By Claim A Q is 
consistent. This contradicts the facts that p + B E Cn( Q)\E and E is by Theorem 34 
a maximal consistent subset of W U Z,(D) U (4 1 :q%/c+b E I(D)} that contains p + /). 
Therefore the assumption that there is a model M’ of @ such that M’(Exceptiona1) c 
M(Exceptiona1) is false, and M /= @circ. q 
Theorem 79. Let G = (V, Ed, P, N) be a class-property network with classes C c V. Let 
0 be the translation of G as defined by Brewka. Let @circ be the result of circumscribing 
Exceptional in @ with otherpredicates varied. Let Ac = (D, W) be the translation of G as 
given in Definition 42 and let PG be the priorities for AC; as given in Dejinition 46. Let A = 
(I(D), W U I,(D)) and P = ((:P~BIP-,B,:P’-,B~IP’-,B’) I p:BIBPcp’:B’lB’l. 
Then,for all p E V\C, @circ j= Holds(p, U. T) ifand only if A k=“, p. 
Proof. Because G is good and hence acyclic. Lemmata 77 and 78 can be applied, and by 
Lemma 47 P, is a strict partial order. Assume @,-ire F Holds(p, U, T), that is, there is 
a model M such that M + @circ and M F Holds(p, U, T). By Lemma 77 there is a P- 
prefetredd extension E of A such that p $ E. Hence A k$ p. Assume A t#=$ p, that is, 
there is a P-preferredd extension E of A such that p 4 E. By Lemma 78 there is a model 
A4 such that M + Cpcirc and M E Holds(p. U, T). Hence @circ k Holds(p, U, T). q 
7. Conclusions 
We extended Reiter’s default logic [22] with a notion of priorities that is based on 
lexicographic comparison. It turned out that there are two ways of defining lexicographic 
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comparison for strict partial orders. Also, there are at least two ways to value a default 
with respect to an extension. These alternatives yield four different definitions of preferred 
extensions in default logic. We investigated questions concerning the relations between 
different kinds of preferred extensions, existence of preferred extensions, and other 
properties. Also, we established a relationship between default logic with our definition 
of priorities and those by Brewka [6] and Ryan [26]. 
In the second part of the work, we gave two translations of inheritance networks to 
prioritized default logic and showed their equivalence to inheritance theories respectively 
by Gelfond and Przymusinska [lo] and by Brewka [4]. Brewka’s theory is expressed as 
a set of formulae in the first-order logic, and resolution of inheritance conflicts is based 
on McCarthy’s circumscription. Our representation of inheritance networks is simpler than 
Gelfond and Przymusinska’s. First, our translation avoids the reification of inheritance 
networks, that is, each link of an inheritance network can be represented as a default in 
Reiter’s default logic, whereas Gelfond and Przymusinska have formulae of autoepistemic 
logic that describe the properties of links that are represented by atomic formulae. Second, 
the multiple extensions for inheritance networks is simply due to multiple extensions of the 
corresponding default theories. Gelfond and Przymusinska resolve inheritance conflicts by 
introducing the notion of explanation that is not present in the definition of autoepistemic 
logic. Multiple extensions in inheritance networks correspond to the existence of multiple 
explanations. The explanations correspond to sets of defeated defaults in our translation. 
Future research should address the problem of automating default reasoning with 
priorities, and apply these techniques for solving problems in knowledge representation 
and related areas. In addition to inheritance reasoning, problems like model-based 
diagnosis [23] and temporal reasoning can be expressed in default logic. The applicability 
of priorities in these contexts should be investigated. After a problem has been formalized, 
effective methods for solving it are needed, and therefore work on automating reasoning in 
prioritized default logics is important. An investigation on the complexity of prioritized 
default reasoning [25] points out similarities and differences to default reasoning 
without priorities, and suggests approaches for automating prioritized default reasoning. 
Techniques for automating reasoning with restricted forms of prioritized defaults [2] and 
for defaults without priorities [ 191 have been presented in earlier research. A natural next 
step would be to extend these techniques to the more general case of prioritized default 
theories. 
Appendix A. Auxiliary results 
Lemma A.1. Let (D, W) be a default theory in which all defaults in D are prerequisite- 
free. Then for all E G C, E is an extension of (D, W) if and only if 
: BI 1.. .( Bn E D (_& 
I..., 
Y 
Lemma A.2. Let D and D’ be sets of defaults such that D’ C: D. Then Cnw(D’) C: 
Cnw (D). 
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Lemma A.3. Let E be a set offormulae and D a set of defaults. Let DE = (a:/?~, . . . , ,&/y 
EDI{+,..*, -&} n E = fl} and DE = (6 E D 1 not def(S, E)}. Then DE 2: DE. 
Lemma A.4 Let E be a set of formulae and D u set of defaults. Then Cnw(DE) = 
Cnw(DE), where DE = (6 E D 1 notdef(6, E)} and DE = (a:B1,. . . , /k/y E D I 
{-PI, . . . , -A 1 n E = fl). 
Lemma A.5 Let D be a set of defaults, W a set of formulae, and E = Cnw (D) SO that 
-fi $ E for all c~a/y E D and B in cr. Let D’ = (a:a/y E D 1 a E Cnw(D)}. Then E is 
an extension of (D’, W) and D’ = GD(E, (D’. W)). 
Proof. Because -/3 E E for no c~:cr/y E D’ and /3 in O, DfE = D’. Because D’ 2 D, by 
Lemma A.2 Cnw (D’) C Cnw (0). We show by induction that Cnw (D) C Cnw (0’). Let 
CO,Cl,... be the sets in Definition 2 for Cnw (D), and CA, C; , . . . for Cnw (D’). 
Induction hypothesis: Ci E Cf. 
Base case i = 0: C,!, = W = Co by definition. 
Inductive case i 3 1: Assume that y E Ci. If y E C;_I then by induction hypothesis 
y E Cc_, c C,!. If y E Ci\C’-1, then (Z-1 b a! for some a:a/y E D. Because (Y-1 5 E 
and E is closed under logical consequence, Q E E and hence KU/~ E D’. By induction 
hypothesis Ci_ 1 5 Ci_ , and hence Cl_ I + ct. Therefore y E Ci. 
Hence Cnw (0) = Cnw (0’) and Cnw( 0’) is an extension of (D’, W). Because for all 
cu:a/y E D’ CI E E and -/I E E for no B f Q, by definition D’ = GD(E, {D’, W)). q 
The extensions of two default theories that differ only slightly are in many cases closely 
related. The following lemmata describe connections of this kind. 
Lemma A.6. Let cr and y be formulae and o a sequence offornzulae that contains /I. Let 
E be a set offormulae such that -B e E. Then E is an extension of (D U {a:a/y), W) if 
and only if E is an extension of { D, W). 
Lemma A.7. Let E be a set offormulae such that a $ E. Then E is an extension of (D, W) 
ifand only if E is an extension of (D U (cr:cr/y). W). 
Lemma A.8. Let (D, W) be a default theory in which prerequisites, justifications and 
conclusions in D are literals, and every default in D is either normal or has no 
justifications, and W is u consistent set of literals. Let E be an extension of (D, W). 
Let cu:o/y be a default such that CY E E and -y $ E and fl is the empty sequence or 
consists of y, and y:o’/y’ E D for no 0’ and y’. Then E’ = Cn(E U {y)) is an extension 
of(D U {cm/y}. W). 
Proof. Define DE = (6 E D 1 not def(6, E)} and Dk, = (6 E D’ 1 not def(d, E’)) where 
D’ = D U (a:a/y). Assume that ~y’:u’/y’ E DE. Hence either (Y’ $ E, or a’ E E and 
-#?’ E E for no j?’ in c’. In the first case, because y is not the prerequisite of any 
default in D and E’ is the closure of a set of literals under logical consequence, CX’ +! E’. 
Hence fy’:&/y’ f Ok,. In the second case, y’ E E, and hence y’ # j7. Because E’ is the 
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closure of a set of literals under logical consequence and g’ is the empty sequence or 
it consists of y’, -B’ E E’ for no #I’ in 0’. Hence a’~‘/ y’ E Dk, and DE _C 0;. That 
DL, E DE U {c~:a/y) is immediate because E C E’. Because ly $ E’, ax/y E Di,. 
Hence Dk, = DE U (cr:a/y). 
By Definition 2 and Lemma A.4 E = Cnw(DE). We show that E’ = Cnw(Dk,). Let 
co. Cl, . . . be the sets in the definition of Cnw(DE) in Definition 2, and Ck, C; , . . . the 
sets for Cnw(Db,). 
z?znduction hypothesis: cj 2 C( c c; u { y ). 
Basecasei=O:Co=W=CA. 
Inductive case i 3 1: Assume that y’ E Ci If y’ E Ci- 1, then by induction hypothesis 
y’ E CI_t C Ci. If y’ E C;\Ci-1, then there is cr’:a’/y’ E DE such that Ci_1 + a’. By 
induction hypothesis Ci_ i 2 C(_, , and because DE s Dk,, y’ E C( by definition. Then we 
show the second inclusion. Assume that y ’ E Cr. If y’ E C!_, , then by induction hypothesis 
y’~C;_t U(y) C C; U{y}. If y’~ C(\C(_r, then C,!_, +a’ forsomea':a'/y'E DL,. 
If y’ = y, then clearly y E Ci U [y}. Otherwise a’:c’/y’ E DE. Because by induction 
hypothesisC(_t ~C~-~U(y),andC;_~U(y)~~‘,~‘~C~-~U{~}.Becauseyisnotthe 
prerequisite of any default in D and Cr_, is a set of literals, a’ E C,_ I . Hence (Z-1 b (11’ 
and y’ E Ci by definition. 
Because a! E E, cx E Cj C Cj for some j 3 0. Therefore by definition y E C(,+, C 
Ui20Cn(CI). Therefore E’ = Cnw(Dk,) and Cn(E U (y}) is an extension of (D U 
@=/Yl, W. 0 
The following lemmata on propositional 2-literal Horn clauses are used in Sections 5.3 
and 6.2. We define Horn clauses as formulae p1 A . A y, + 1 where pi are propositional 
variables and 1 is a literal. 
Lemma A.9. Let p be a literal and S a consistent set of literals and implications q -+ B’ 
such that q is a propositional variable and ,B’ is a literal and j3 # -4. If S + j3, then ,6 E S 
or S b p,for some p+@ E S. 
Lemma A.lO. Let S U {p + p) be a consistent set of literals and formulae p’ + /Y such 
that p’ is a propositional variable and j?’ is a literal and p’ # #3. Then if S k q and 
S U {p-+ j3) b q for a propositional variable q, then q = p. 
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